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The expansion of legal liability, especially in the professional service and
manufacturing industries, has been a major characteristic of American civil
law in this century.' A rare exception to this development has involved the
* Assistant Professor of Law and Assistant Dean for Undergraduate Academic
Affairs, Howard University School of Business. J.D., Harvard (1980); B.A., University
of Virginia (1977).
1. See O'Brien, The Legal Environment of the Accounting Profession, 25 DUQ.
L. REV. 283 (1987) where the author notes, "[tlhe days when professions were largely
autonomous, self-regulated and immune from significant external legal influences are
over." Id. at 283. "The liability of all professionals is expanding at an unprecedented
pace, as legal theories that would have been unthinkable twenty years ago are pursued
with relish." Id. at 283 n.2. Another commentator notes, "[p]rofessions once seemingly
inviolate from litigation are no longer sacrosanct. The age old axiom that physicians
bury their mistakes while attorneys ... file theirs away has little relevance in modern
day America." Mess, Accountants and the Common Law: Liability to Third Parties,
52 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 838, 838 n.1 (1977) (citing Eizenstat & Speer, Accountants'
Professional Liability: Expanding Exposure, 22 FED. INS. COUNS. Q. 7 (1972)). See
also Cotchett, Liability of Accountants and Lawyers, 23 TRIAL 28, 29 (April 1987).
"[T]he trend of judicial decisions dealing with professional liability has been toward
holding professionals responsible to third-party non-clients . . . ." Id. If increased litig-
iousness is any measure, a virtual explosion of liability is taking place. In 1982 there
were 206,193 civil lawsuits filed in federal court, twice the number filed in 1974, and
three and a half times the number filed in 1960. Federal appeals jumped sevenfold
between 1960 and 1982. The number of state suits increased by 22% between 1977
and 1982, and state appeals increased by 32% in the same period. Minow, Account-
ants' Liability and the Litigation Explosion, 58 J. ACCT. 70 (1984). These develop-
ments have been attributed to the combined result of creative litigators, deep pockets,
expanded theories of tort liability, consumer awareness, and commercial greed. Weiner,
Common Law Liability of the Certified Public Accountant for Negligent Misrepresen-
tation, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 233, 234 (1983). See also Comment, Liability to Third
Parties for Economic Injury: Privity as a Useful Animal, or a Blind Imitation of the
Past, 12 Sw. L.J. 87, 113-16 (1981) [hereinafter Comment, Privity]. For cases that
have expanded liability in the professional services and manufacturing industries, see
Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 923, 616 P.2d 813, 817, 167 Cal. Rptr.
831, 835 (1980) (physicians); J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 804-05, 598
P.2d 60, 63, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407, 409 (1979) (general contractors); Tarasoff v. Regents
of Univ., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 434-35, 551 P.2d 334, 342-43, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 22-23
(1976) (psychiatrists); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377
P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963) (tool manufacturers); Lucas v. Hamm,
56 Cal. 2d 583, 589, 364 P.2d 685, 687, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 823 (1961) (notaries pub-
lic); Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc. v. Moore, 67 Cal. App. 3d 278, 301, 136 Cal. Rptr.
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accounting profession: courts have insulated accountants from liability to any
parties beyond their direct clients.2 Changes in the law are now occurring,
however, that will significantly affect the legal responsibility of accountants. 3
The legal controversy focuses on the fairness of permitting those entities
that lack privity of contract with the accountant to recover damages for negli-
gent misrepresentation. 4 A typical scenario begins when a third party who is
interested in doing business with a company - extending credit, buying stock
or writing an insurance policy - relies on an audit of the business provided by
the accountant in reaching a positive decision. Unknown to the third party, the
603, 617 (1977) (architects); M. Miller Co. v. Central Contra Costa Sanitary Dist.,
198 Cal. App. 2d 305, 308, 18 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15 (1961) (engineers); MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 390, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1926) (car manufactur-
ers). See also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979) (applying negligence
standard to physicians); Maggipinto v. Reichman, 607 F.2d 621 (3d Cir. 1979) (apply-
ing negligence standard to dentists); Nauman v. Harold K. Beecher & Assoc., 24 Utah
2d 172, 467 P.2d 610 (1970) (applying negligence standard to architects). See gener-
ally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 284, 289, 291 (1981).
2. See infra note 11.
3. There has been an expansion in the scope of an accountant's civil liability for
negligence as most jurisdictions now concede that at least under certain circumstances
the accountant has some legal responsibility to third parties. The pivotal issue is to
which third parties a duty is owed. See infra notes 10-14; see also Annotation, Liabil-
ity of Public Accountant to Third Parties, 46 A.L.R. 3D 979, 984-96 (1972). There has
also been a dramatic rise in the number of lawsuits brought against accountants. Mi-
now, supra note 1, at 76 (accountants had been largely unaffected by any growing
litigation concerns, "but the proliferation of lawsuits against them since the 1970's
have drawn accountants into the midst of the legal thicket"); Collins, Professional Lia-
bility: The Situation Worsens, J. ACCT., Nov. 1985, at 60 ("A recent study notes that
since 1980, the eight largest accounting firms alone have paid nearly $180 million in
settling audit-related litigation."). Eight large international accounting firms dominate
the business of auditing large publicly held companies. These CPA firms, commonly
knows as the "Big Eight," are (in alphabetical order): Arthur Andersen Co., Arthur
Young Co., Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte Haskins & Sells, Ernst & Whinney, Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Price Waterhouse & Co., and Touche Ross Co. M. STE-
VENS, THE BIG EIGHT 2 (1981). "[C]lients of the Big Eight account for 94 percent of
all sales, 94 percent of all profits, 90 percent of all income taxes paid, 94 percent of all
people employed, and 94 percent of all assets owned by New York Stock Exchange
members." Id. at 8. See J. SCHWARTZ, CORPORATE POLICY: A CASEBOOK 216 (1978)
("The need for credibility and the large staffs necessary to audit a major corporation
have been the primary factors in the development of a high degree of concentration in
the [accounting] profession."); see also Fiflis, Current Problems of Accountants' Re-
sponsibilities to Third Parties, 28 VAND. L. REV. 31, 33-34 (1975); Griffin, The Belea-
guered Accountants: A Defendant's Viewpoint, 62 A.B.A.J. 759, 759 (1976); Note,
New York Upholds Ultramares and Delineates Three-Part Test Which Noncontrac-
tual Parties Must Satisfy to Hold Accountants Liable in Negligence, 17 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 1025, 1026-28 (1986). [hereinafter Note, New York Upholds Ultramares].
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977) defines "negligent misrepre-
sentation" by a professional as the failure "to exercise reasonable care or competence
in obtaining or communicating the information" for the guidance of others in business
transactions. 2
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audit was performed in a negligent5 fashion, missing significant errors in the
accounting procedures of the company or perhaps even failing to detect fraud
by management, resulting in the overvaluation of the business. If the company
subsequently falters and the third party bears a loss, should the party be able
to recover from the accountant when the audit was done negligently? Or must
the third party bear the loss since she had not paid the accountant for the
service?
Twenty years ago there was an easy answer to these questions: third par-
ties, almost without exception, were unable to recover damages in suits against
accountants for negligence.6 But changes in the accountant's role in commer-
cial transactions7 and in the maturing of accounting as a profession8 have led
5. Negligence has been defined as "conduct which falls below the standard estab-
lished by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm; it is [a]
'departure from the conduct expectable of a reasonably prudent person under like cir-
cumstances.'" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 930-31 (5th ed. 1979).
6. See Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 90 (D.R.I. 1968) ("No
appellate court, English or American has even held an accountant liable in negligence
to reliant parties not in privity."); see also Citizens State Bank v. Timm Schmidt &
Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361 (1983); Brodsky & Swanson, The Expanded
Liability of Accountants for Negligence, 12 SEC. REG. L.J. 252 (1984); Note, Account-
ants' Liabilities for False and Misleading Financial Statements, 67 COLUM. L. REV.
1437 (1967).
Exceptions to this general rule lie in the area of securities regulation. "Reckless
behavior has been recognized as sufficient to hold an accountant liable to investors
under § 10(b) and Rule lob-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." McLean v.
Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197 (3d Cir. 1979).
7. The duties and responsibilities of accountants have expanded considerably in
the past fifty years. The profession itself now recognizes that an accounting statement
is no longer merely a tool for management, but rather an instrument for investment
decision-making by the general public. See Comment, Auditors' Responsibility for
Misrepresentation: Inadequate Protection for Users of Financial Statements, 44
WASH. L. REV. 139, 178 (1968). "Under present conditions, the principal effect of the
auditor's opinion to management is to meet the requirements of, and influence the ac-
tions of, third parties with whom the auditor has no contract." Id. In the present busi-
ness environment, financial information can be presented in such a complex fashion
with such sophisticated methodology that potential users must rely on accountants to
put the data into a usable form. "[L]ike the mysteries of ancient Egypt, you need an
elite priesthood to define and interpret what appears in the financial statements." Id.
Weiner reports that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget confessed,
"[n]one of us really understands what's going on with all of those numbers.. ." Wei-
ner, supra note 1, at 235 (quoting W. Greider, The Education of David Stockman,
ATL, Dec. 1982, at 38). For an excellent analysis of the historical development of the
accountant's role in society, see J. CAREY, THE RISE OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION
(1969), J. DAVIES, CPA LIABILITY - A MANUAL FOR PRACTITIONERS 1 (1983). See
also Fiflis, supra note 3, at 105-06; and Mess, supra note 1, at 838-40, 855-57. See
generally Besser, Privity? - An Obsolete Approach to the Liability of Accountants to
Third Parties, 7 SETON HALL 507 (1976); Burton, The Evolutionary Revolution in
Public Accounting, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1041 (1987); Weiner, supra note 1, at 236-
46; Note, Accountants' Liability for Negligence - A Contemporary Approach for a
Modern Profession, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 401-08 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Con-
3
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courts to reevaluate this view.9 The issue is governed by state law, for the state
determines the situations in which a plaintiff can recover compensation from a
defendant in tort. The legal system does not now provide a consistent response.
The accountant's liability, if any, to third parties depends on the particular
state's law that governs the transaction. The judiciary is usually responsible
for the final determination, since state legislatures seldom pass laws stating
specifically the conditions under which an accountant can be sued.
Currently, three significantly different standards determine the extent of
an accountant's liability to non-clients for negligence: 10 1) the traditional
temporary Approach]; Note, Negligent Misrepresentation and the Certified Public Ac-
countant: An Overview of Common Law Liability to Third Parties, 18 SUFFOLK U.L.
REV. 431, 431-33 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Negligent Misrepresentation]; Note, Torts
- Accountant's Liability - An Independent Auditor Who Furnishes a Financial State-
ment Owes a Duty to All Those Whom the Auditor Should Reasonably Foresee as
Recipients of that Opinion; One Who is Not in Privity with the Auditor But Who
Relies on Such Statements May Recover in Negligence, 29 VILL. L. REv. 563, 581
(1983-1984) [hereinafter Note, Accountants' Liability]. For a judicial discussion of the
change in the role of the accountant, see H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324,
345, 461 A.2d 138, 149 (1983); Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 122 N.H.
898, 903-04, 451 A.2d 1308, 1311-12 (1982); Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers &
Lybrand, 70 Ohio St. 2d 154, 157, 436 N.E.2d 212, 214-15 (1982); Note, New York
Upholds Ultramares, supra note 3, at 1026-28. See generally infra notes 165-66.
8. Accounting is no longer a fledgling profession in need of judicial protection.
See Bradley, Auditor's Liability and the Need for Increased Accounting Uniformity,
30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 898, 921 (1965) ("in the light of the economic matura-
tion of the independent accounting profession ... dependence on ... judicial solitude
seems ill-advised"); All Eyes on Accountants, TIME, April 21, 1986, at 61 (annual
revenues of the accounting profession approximate $10 billion, 60% of which is derived
from audit work); see also Weiner, supra note 1, at 236 n.10; Note, Contemporary
Approach, supra note 7, at 404 n.23 where the author notes that by 1981 the eight
largest domestic firms audited 80% of the companies traded on the New York and
American stock exchanges and themselves grossed over 6 billion.
9. Bradley, Liability to Third Persons for Negligent Audit, 1966 J. Bus. L. 190,
196 ("The legal duties of the auditor ought to be coextensive with his professional
pretensions. He aspires to more than being a rubber stamp for management, so his
legal duties ought to go beyond that status....").
10. See Gormley, The Foreseen, the Foreseeable, and Beyond - Accountants' Li-
ability to Nonclients, 14 SETON HALL 528 (1984) for a thorough analysis of the mean-
ing, application, and inconsistencies of the current doctrine. For even a further stan-
dard, in which the court uses a balancing test to determine the defendant accountant's
liability, see Alumna Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1973); Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Beckaert & Holland, 79 N.C. App. 81,
339 S.E.2d 62 (1986). In the latter case the factors considered by the court were the
extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; whether it was
foreseeable that failure to discover and disclose that the accountant's client had a sub-
stantial negative net worth would harm creditors who extended credit relying on the
defendant's audit; whether the plaintiff had suffered injury; and whether the defend-
ant's negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. Based on these factors,
the court found that plaintiff had stated a cause of action for negligent misrepresenta-
tion. See also Achampong, Common Law Liability of Accountants for Negligence to
Non-contractual Parties: Recent Developments, 91 DICK. L. REv. 677, 687 nn.74, 75
696 [Vol. 53
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perspective of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche Ross & Co." allows negligence
actions only by parties in privity of contract or in a situation "so close as to
approach that of privity"; 12 2) under the Restatement (Second) of Torts stan-
dard a person or a limited class of persons who the auditor can be foresee as
parties who will (and do) rely upon financial statements are allowed recov-
ery;' 3 and 3) the "reasonably foreseeable" standard permits all parties who are
reasonably foreseeable recipients of financial statements for business purposes
(1987) for an argument that this is "in effect, a traditional negligence standard
couched in different terms," especially considering the fact the plaintiff was not specifi-
cally foreseen. The balancing test was first used in Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647,
320 P.2d 16 (1958) to determine the liability of a notary public. See generally Weiner,
supra note 1, at 255-56; Note, Negligent Misrepresentation, supra note 7, at 442-43.
11. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). In elegant language, Justice Cardozo's
opinions singled out accountants for the protection of the privity doctrine, while recog-
nizing that the privity requirement had disappeared in most other areas. This decision
prevailed for over thirty years in every jurisdiction in which the issue arose. Citizens
State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 379, 335 N.W.2d 361, 364
(1983) (citing Weiner, supra note 1, at 236); see also Besser, Privity? An Obsolete
Approach to the Liability of Accountants to Third Parties, 7 SETON HALL L. REV.
507, 516 (1976). Seven jurisdictions currently apply or cite this standard favorably,
requiring privity or a relationship between the parties sufficiently approaching privity:
Colorado (Stephens Indus. Inc. v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357 (10th Circuit 1971));
Delaware (McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979)); Florida (Investors
Tax Sheltered Real Estate, Ltd. v. Lawenthol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 370
So. 2d 815 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); see also Canaveral Capital Corp. v. Bruce, 214
So. 2d 505 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Investment Corp. v. Buchman, 208 So. 2d 291
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968)); Indiana (Toro Co. v. Krouse, Kern & Co., Inc., 827 F.2d
155 (7th Cir. 1987)); Kansas (Koch Indus., Inc. v. Vosko, 494 F.2d 713 (10th Cir.
1974); see also Western Sur. Co. v. Loy, 3 Kan. App. 2d 310, 595 P.2d 257 (1979));
New York (Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536, 483
N.E.2d 110, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1985)); Oregon (United States Nat'l Bank v. Fought,
46 Or. App. 635 P.2d 754 (1980)).
12. 255 N.Y. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 446.
13. The text of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977) appears
infra note 130. Fifteen jurisdictions have adopted or favorably cited the Restatement,
recognizing an auditor's liability to a foreseen third party: Georgia (Badische Corp. v.
Caylor, 257 Ga. 131, 356 S.E.2d 198 (1987)); Hawaii (In re Hawaii Corp., 567 F.
Supp. 609 (D. Hawaii 1983)); Iowa (Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969));
Kentucky (Ingram Indus., Inc. v. Nowicki, 527 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ky. 1981)); Minne-
sota (Bonhiver v. Graff, 311 Minn. 111, 248 N.W.2d 291 (1976)); Missouri (Tiffany
Indus., Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 536 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Mo. 1982); 999 v. Cox & Co.,
574 F. Supp. 1026 (E.D. Mo. 1983)); Nebraska (Seed Kem, Inc. v. Safranek, 466 F.
Supp. 340 (D. Neb. 1979)); New Hampshire (Spherex Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co.,
122 N.H. 898, 451 A.2d 1308 (1982)); North Dakota (Bunye Corp. v. Eide, 372 F.
Supp. 1058 (D.N.D. 1974)); Ohio (Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 70
Ohio St. 2d 154, 436 N.E.2d 212 (1982)); Pennsylvania (Eisenburg v. Gagnon, 766
F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1985)); Rhode Island (Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85
(D.R.I. 1968)); Texas (Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1971)); Utah (Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974)). See
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to recover as long as they rely on the statements for those business purposes.1'
This diversity of opinion is demonstrated by the most recent decisions on
the issue. In Toro Co. v. Krouse, Kern & Co.,' 5 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, applying Indiana law, used Ultramares as the
basis for its decision to deny recovery to a plaintiff who was unable to demon-
strate either a contractual relationship with the accountant or evidence of any
contact with the accountant indicating a knowledge of the plaintiff's reliance. 16
On the other hand, the Mississippi Supreme Court in Touche Ross & Co. v.
Commercial Union Insurance Co. 17 upheld recovery for Commercial Union, a
company completely unknown to the defendant accountant, holding the ac-
countant should have reasonably foreseen that an entity such as the plaintiff
might rely on the audit.'
An understanding of the role and responsibility of the certified public ac-
countant in the twentieth century is necessary to understand the current status
of accountant's liability to third parties.
THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ACCOUNTANT
Although certified public accountants are often involved in a number of
aspects of their clients' businesses, including management consulting, execu-
tive recruiting, and performing a number of tax services; their primary source
of revenue is auditing.19 The accountant's special function is to scrutinize the
financial statements2" prepared by a business and express an opinion as to the
14. Four states have adopted this standard: California (International Mortgage
Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d 806, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218
(1986)); Mississippi (Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d
315 (Miss. 1987)); New Jersey (Rosenblum v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138
(1983)); Wisconsin (Citizens State Bank v. Trimm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376,
335 N.W.2d 361 (1983)).
15. 827 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1987).
16. Id. at 161.
17. 514 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 1987).
18. Id. at 322-23.
19. See Fiflis, supra note 3, at 34 n.14 where the author notes that the audit
function makes up approximately 70-80% of an accounting firm's revenues. See also
A. ARENS & J. LOEBBECKE, AUDITING: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH chs. 7, 9 (3d ed.
1984); Hagen, Certified Public Accountants' Liability for Malpractice: Effect of Com-
pliance with GAAP and GAAS, 13 J. CONT. L. 65, 66 (1987); Note, Contemporary
Approach, supra note 7, at 401-02.
20. The four basic financial statements are: (1) the balance sheet, (2) the income
statement, (3) the statement of retained earnings, and (4) the statement of changes in
financial position. The balance sheet shows the financial position of an entity at a par-
ticular moment in time, usually the end of the accounting period, e.g., December 31.
The income statement reports the results of operations, i.e., the earnings or losses, of
the entity for a given period of time, e.g., one year. The statement of retained earnings
shows the sources and uses of either cash or working capital of the entity for a certain
time period. See HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING chs. 9-2 through 9-4 (J.
Burton, R. Palmer & R. Kay, eds. 1981) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]; B. NEEDLES, FI-
[Vol. 53
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accuracy with which the statements present the company's actual financial po-
sition and operations in accordance with generally accepted accounting princi-
ples (GAAP).21 The company itself uses this information in business planning
and outsiders with an interest in the company need it to scrutinize the profit-
ability of their investment.22
The audit process involves three general stages: the investigation and col-
lection of data; the drawing of inferences from the findings; and the presenta-
tion of conclusions. 23 As a preliminary task, the auditor must become familiar
with the nature, operation, and organization of the client's business. He re-
views annual reports, tax returns, organizational charts, and accounting manu-
als; investigates the client's manufacturing, marketing, and budgeting tech-
niques; collects information on major customers; and inspects plant facilities.2 4
After the auditor studies the client's prior financial statements and basic ac-
counting procedures she makes a preliminary evaluation of the client's internal
control system and develops an "audit program". The audit program serves as
the detailed guide to the audit, describing the specific procedures to be fol-
lowed so as to ascertain the reliability and integrity of the client's recordkeep-
ing system. 5 The auditor will trace sample transactions throughout the system
to determine, for example, whether a purchase order was properly authorized
before an item was ordered. 26 He will also match the reports of goods retained
in the receiving department with vendors' invoices or perhaps contact custom-
ers to confirm accounts receivable or banks to verify balances.27 The better the
results of these "compliance tests," the less need there is for the auditor to use
"substitute tests" (such as observing the taking of inventory) to evaluate the
NANCIAL ACCOUNTING 10-13 (1983).
21. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Professional Standards,
AU § 110.01 (1980) [hereinafter AICPA Standards]; see also H. Rosenblum, Inc. v.
Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 332, 461 A.2d 138, 142 (1983); Bilek, Accountant's Liability to
the Third Party and Public Policy: A Calabresi Approach, 39 Sw. L.J. 689, 691-92
(1985); Fiflis, supra note 3, at 35-42; Weiner, supra note 1, at 237; Accountant's Lia-
bility, supra note 7, at 564; Note, Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler: CPAs Liable at Common
Law to Certain Reasonably Foreseeable Third Parties Who Detrimentally Rely on
Negligently Audited Financial Statements, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 339 (1985)
[hereinafter CPAs Liability].
22. Mesh, A Basic Approach to Accountants' Liability, 4 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
299, 301 (1980); see Wyatt, Auditor's Responsibilities, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 331
(1968).
23. See Hawkins, Professional Negligence Liability of Public Accountants, 12
VAND. L. REV. 797, 803 (1959); Contemporary Approach, supra note 7, at 402. For a
comprehensive examination of the stages of an audit, see Fiflis, supra note 3, at 37-42.
24. Fiflis, supra note 3, at 37; Hagen, supra note 19, at 67; Contemporary Ap-
proach, supra note 7, at 402. For a discussion of the various procedures that an auditor
uses to gather evidence, see A. ARENS & J. LOEBBECKE, supra note 19, at 170-74; J.
ROBERTSON & F. DAVIS, AUDITING 19 (4th ed. 1985).
25. Id. at 207, 213-14, 304-08; Fiflis, supra note 3, at 37; Hagen, supra note 19,
at 68.
26. Hagen, supra note 19, at 68.
27. Fiflis, supra note 3, at 38; Contemporary Approach, supra note 7, at 401.
1988]
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proficiency of the internal control system.28 The auditor must always be aware
of the possibility of deliberate misrepresentation by management and should
probe any suspicious circumstances. 29
At the completion of the audit program, the auditor will have working
papers3° covering each item listed in the audit procedure. This information will
form the basis for the integration of the audit findings with the financial state-
ments of the business.31 The most significant items in the financial statement
require strong supporting evidence. 2 Management will then give the auditor a
28. AICPA Standards, supra note 21, § 350.19, at 463-66; Fiflis, supra note 3,
at 38; Hagen, supra note 9, at 68. See generally A. ARENS & J. LOEBBECKE, supra
note 19, at 150-52; J. ROBERTSON & F. DAVIS, supra note 24, at 19; HANDBOOK, supra
note 20, ch. 7-20.
29. See Fiflis, supra note 3, at 97:
The auditor's duty does not permit him to wait for an alarm bell to
arouse him to investigation. He has a duty in the first instance to focus a
skeptical eye on the accounts. That is the purpose of an audit - it is not
merely an arithmetical check and a determination of compliance with form.
One of the things GAAS specifically includes is a duty to look for the suspi-
cious circumstances that in turn will raise the auditor's duty to probe to the
bottom.
See also Bilek, supra note 21, at 692, where the author concludes that "[a]n account-
ant is expected to ... [play] the role of [a] watchdog, thus enabling each interested
person to detect whether his interest is in jeopardy." Id. Although a thorough examina-
tion cannot assure that illegal acts will be detected, "[n]onetheless, the independent
auditor should be expected to detect illegal or improper acts that would be uncovered
in the exercise of normal professional skill and care." H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93
N.J. 324, 344, 461 A.2d 138, 148 (1983). For a further discussion, see Ebke, In Search
of Alternatives: Comparative Reflections of Corporate Governance and the Indepen-
dent Auditor's Responsibilities, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 663 (1984), Minow, supra note 1,
at 78; Romney, Albrecht & Cherrington, Auditors and the Detection of Fraud, 149 J.
AccT. 63 (1980); Comment, Auditor's Third Party Liability: An Ill Conceived Exten-
sion of the Law, 46 WASH. L. REV. 675, 691-92 (1971).
30. Working papers serve mainly to: 1) Aid the auditor in the conduct of his
work, 2) Provide an important support for the auditor's opinion, including his represen-
tation as to compliance with the generally accepted auditing standards. AICPA Stan-
dards, supra note 21, § 328.02, at 441. Working papers are the records kept by the
independent auditor of the procedures he followed, the tests he performed, the informa-
tion he obtained, and the conclusions he reached pertinent to his examination. Working
papers, accordingly, may include work programs, analyses, memoranda, letters of con-
firmation and representation, abstracts of company documents, and schedules or com-
mentaries prepared or obtained by the auditor. Id. § 338.03, at 441.
Working papers should fit the circumstances and the auditor's needs on the en-
gagement to which they apply. The factors affecting the independent auditor's judg-
ment as to the quantity, type, and content of the working papers desirable for a partic-
ular engagement include (a) the nature of the auditor's report, (b) the nature of the
financial statements, schedules, or other information upon which the auditor is report-
ing, (c) the nature and condition of the client's records and internal controls, and (d)
the needs in particular circumstances for supervision and review of the work performed
by any assistants. Id. § 338.04, at 441-42. See also Fiflis, supra note 3, at 39-40.
31. Fiflis, supra note 3, at 40.
32. "It is fundamental that there should be stronger grounds to sustain the audi-
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letter of representation that the financial statements are accurate and that dis-
closure has been complete.33
The final stage of the audit is the audit report or opinion which evaluates
the information obtained to determine if the client's financial statements accu-
rately reflect the financial condition of the business.3
In an "unqualified report," the accountant indicates that, on the basis of
an examination made in accordance with generally accepted auditing stan-
dards (GAAS), an opinion has been formed without exception, reservation, or
qualification that the financial statements of the audited entity present fairly
its financial position. 35
In a "qualified report," the accountant states that an improper accounting
technique has been applied to one or more items in the report which would
have a material, but not a pervasive effect upon the statements. 3 "Except for"
or "subject to" this particular matter, the financial statements present fairly
the financial position of the business. 37 This sort of opinion will be given when
tor's opinion of relatively important items in the financial statements and those with
possibilities of relatively material error than are required to sustain his opinion of items
without these characteristics." Fiflis, supra note 3, at 39. "Financial insecurity of the
business also has a significant influence on how far the auditor's procedure must go."
Id.
33. AICPA Standards, supra note 21, § 333.04; see also Fiflis, supra note 3, at
39-40.
34. AICPA Standards, supra note 21, § 110.01, at 61; see also Fiflis, supra note
3, at 40; Weiner, supra note 1, at 237 (the auditor's report "normally forms the basis
for any assertion of liability against [the CPA]," because the report usually contains
representations that he has conducted the audit in accordance with GAAS and that the
financial statements are presented in accordance with the GAAP).
35. The standard unqualified opinion is as follows:
(Scope paragraph)
We have examined the balance sheet of X Company as of [at] December 31,
19XX, and the related statements of income, retained earnings and changes
in financial position for the year then ended. Our examination was made in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards and, accordingly, in-
cluded such tests of the accounting records and such other auditing proce-
dures as we consider necessary in the circumstances.
(Opinion paragraph)
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly the
financial position of X Company as of [at] December 31, 19XX, and the re-
sults of its operations and the changes in its financial position for the year
ended, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles applied on
a basis consistent with that of the preceding year.
AICPA Standards, supra note 21, § 509.07, at 632. See also Fiflis, supra note 3, at
41-42.
36. HANDBOOK, supra note 20, ch. 16, at 5-6.
37. AICPA Standards, supra note 21, § 509.29, at 638. An example of a quali-
fied opinion (due to departures from GAAP) is as follows:
(Scope paragraph)
We have examined the balance sheet of X Company as of [at] December 31,
19XX, and the related statements of income, retained earnings and changes
9
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there are restrictions on the scope of the auditor's examination, a lack of com-
petent evidential matter, changes in accounting principles applied, or signifi-
cant uncertainties that affect the financial statements. 38
An "adverse opinion" states "that the financial statements do not present
fairly the financial position, results of operations or changes in financial posi-
tion in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles."3 9 This
in financial position for the year then ended. Our examination was made in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards and, accordingly, in-
cluded such tests of the accounting records and such other auditing proce-
dures as we consider necessary in the circumstances.
The Company has excluded from property and debt in the accompanying
balance sheet certain lease obligations, which, in our opinion, should be capi-
talized in order to conform with generally accepted accounting principles. If
these lease obligations were capitalized, property would be increased by $....
., long term debt by $ ...... and retained earnings by $ ...... as of December
31, 19XX, and net income and earnings per share would be increased (de-
creased) by $ ..... and $ ..... respectively for the year then ended.
(Opinion paragraph)
In our opinion, except for the effects of not capitalizing lease obligations, as
discussed in the preceding paragraph, the financial statements present fairly..
Id. § 509.36, at 640.
38. Id. § 509.29, at 638.
39. Id. § 509.41, at 642. An example of an adverse opinion is as follows:
(Scope paragraph)
We have examined the balance sheet of X Company as of [at] December 31,
19XX, and the related statements of income, retained earnings and changes
in financial position for the year then ended. Our examination was made in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards and, accordingly, in-
cluded such tests of the accounting records and such other auditing proce-
dures as we consider necessary in the circumstances.
As discussed in Note X to the financial statements, the Company carries
its property, plant and equipment accounts at appraisal values, and provides
depreciation on the basis of such values. Further, the Company does not pro-
vide for income and taxable income arising because of the use, for income tax
purposes, of the installment method of reporting gross profit from certain type
of sales. Generally accepted accounting principles, in our opinion, require that
property, plant and equipment be stated at an amount not in excess of cost,
reduced by depreciation based on such amount, and that deferred income
taxes be provided. Because of the departures from generally accepted ac-
counting principles identified above, as of December 31, 19XX, inventories
have been increased $ ..... by inclusion in manufacturing overhead of depre-
ciation in excess of that add on cost; property, plant and equipment, less accu-
mulated depreciation, is carried at $ ..... in excess of a i amount based on
the cost to the Company; and allocated income tax of $ ..... has not been
recorded; resulting in an increase of $ ..... for the year ended December 31,
19XX, cost of goods sold has been increased $ ..... have not been provided,
resulting in an increase in net income and earnings per share of $ ..... and $.
.... respectively.
(Opinion paragraph)
In our opinion, because of the effects of the matters discussed in the preceding
paragraph, the financial statements referred to above do not present fairly, in
[Vol. 53702
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occurs if any items have a material and pervasive effect on the financial state-
ment that destroys the credibility of the statement.4
A "disclaimer opinion" is a statement by the accountant that it is not
objectively possible to ascertain whether the financial statements conform to
GAAP .4 The accountant renders this opinion only when she cannot form an
opinion because of serious limitations on the scope of the examination.4 2 She
must issue an adverse opinion if she has enough information to conclude that
the statements are an unfair representation .
4
ELEMENTS OF A CAUSE OF ACTION:
WHAT THE THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF MUST PROVE
The accountant has a responsibility to the client to perform the contrac-
tual services in a skillful manner. Failure to render services competently may
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, the financial posi-
tion of X Company as of December 31, 19XX, or the results of its operations
and changes in its financial position for the year then ended.
Id. § 509.43, at 642-43. See also Weiner, supra note 1, at 238.
40. HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 16-5 through 16-6.
41. AICPA Standards, supra note 21, § 509.45, at 643. An example of a dis-
claimer of opinion (due to the inability to obtain sufficient evidential matter) is as
follows:
(Scope paragraph)
Except as set forth in the following paragraph, our examination was made in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards and accordingly in-
cluded such tests of the accounting records and such other audition proce-
dures as we considered necessary.
The Company did not take a physical inventory of merchandise, stated at
$..... in the accompanying financial statements as of December 31, 19XX
and at $ ..... as of December 31, 19XX. Further, evidence supporting the
cost of property and equipment acquired prior to December 31, 19XX is no
longer available. The Company's records do not permit the application of ade-
quate alternative procedures regarding the inventories or the cost of property
and equipment.
(Disclaimer paragraph)
Since the Company did not take physical inventories and we were unable to
apply adequate alternative procedures regarding inventories and the cost of
property and equipment, as noted in the preceding paragraph, the scope of
our work was not sufficient to enable us to express, and we do not express, an
opinion on the financial statements referred to above.
Id. § 509.47, at 644. See also Hagen, supra note 19, at 72.
42. A. ARENS & J. LOEBBECKE, supra note 19, at 43-45. For a discussion of the
rare situations warranting a disclaimer opinion by the CPA, see AICPA Standards,
supra note 21, at 649-50. See also Fiflis, supra note 3, at 42; Weiner, supra note 1, at
238-39 n.18.
43. A. Arens & J. Loebbecke, supra note 19, at 39; HANDBOOK, supra note 20,
at 16-6. See Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner &
Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1972) for the position that a disclaimer of opinion
cannot be issued by the CPA to avoid liability for negligence. See also F. WINDAL &
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result in an action by the client for breach of contract, reformation or rescis-
sion of the agreement, or perhaps even a tort suit by the client for negligent
misrepresentation. 4 Unless the accountant's acts are intentional, however, a
third party is limited to only one action. He must bring a suit under tort law
for negligent misrepresentation. This requires proof of: a legal duty owed to
the plaintiff, breach of that duty, justifiable reliance on the plaintiffs behalf,
damage, and a causal connection between breach and damage.45
Accountants and auditors have the duty to exercise the reasonable care,
judgment, honesty, and independence of a competent member of the profession
in obtaining and communicating information.46 The difficulty lies in the deter-
mination of what conduct is, in fact, reasonable. The profession's 41 own guide-
lines are helpful. The GAAP governs the manner in which the information
regarding a business entity is presented, and the GAAS deals with the audi-
tor's professional qualities and the judgment he exercises in the performance
of his examination and report.4" While proof that the auditor complied with
44. See Besser, supra note 7, at 509 n.10; Fiflis, supra note 3, at 103; see also
Hawkins, supra note 23, at 797-812; Levitin, Accountants' Scope of Liability for De-
fective Financial Reports, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 436, 437-39 (1964).
45. See McDowell, Foreseeability in Contract and Tort: The Problems of Re-
sponsibility and Remoteness, 36 CASE W.L. REv. 286, 299-301 (1985) for a discussion
of these elements; see also W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 107, at 745-48 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER &
KEETON]; Besser, supra note 7, at 537-41; AICPA Standards, supra note 21, at 430.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 1, § 552. See also SEC v.
Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing SEC v. Republic Nat'l
Life Ins., 378 F. Supp. 430, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)); Franklin Supply Co. v. Tolman,
454 F.2d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 1972); Hawaii Corp. v. Crossley, 567 F. Supp. 609, 617
(D. Hawaii 1983). See Fiflis, supra note 3, at 45-49 for a discussion of the importance
of the independence of the auditor.
47. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants is the national pro-
fessional organization of CPAs whose membership is comprised of those who are in
possession of valid and unrevoked certified public accountant certificates issued by the
state boards of accountancy. The AICPA consists of more than 156,000 members, most
of whom are in public practice (86,000) and industry (60,000). See HANDBOOr, supra
note 20, at 39-9; Hagen, supra note 19, at 73 n.47.
48. Fiflis, supra note 3, at 40-41 discusses the distinction between accounting
principles on the one hand, and auditing standards on the other:
"Auditing standards" address the objectives to be attained by the audit
and fix the standard of quality of performance of the audit procedures.
GAAS, as established by the AICPA, require the auditor to exercise skill,
independence and care, compel adequate planning and supervision of the au-
dit including evaluation of the client's internal controls and independent con-
firmations, and require the report of compliance with GAAP.
"Accounting principles," distinguishable from both auditing standards
and auditing procedures, generally deal with such facts or conclusion as the
existence of a deposit in the sum of $1,000 to the First National Bank which
is still outstanding, and provide for certain accounting treatment of that fact;
e.g., that the bank deposit will be designated "cash" in the accounts, instead
of, for example, "Accounts Receivable - First National Bank."
See also Donaldson, Accountants' Liability, TRIAL, Feb. 1987, at 38; Arthur Young &
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these guidelines49 is evidence that may be very persuasive in demonstrating
that he was not negligent, it is not conclusive.5" However, an accountant will
not be able to hide behind esoteric accounting norms if the circumstances
clearly demonstrate that something more is required to disclose the true
Co., 590 F.2d at 789 n.4.
49. The "generally accepted auditing standards" as established by the AICPA
have been briefly stated:
General Standards
1. The examination is to be performed by a person or persons having adequate
technical training and proficiency as an auditor.
2. In all matters relating to the assignment, an independence in mental atti-
tude is to be maintained by the auditor or auditors.
3. Due professional care is to be exercised in the performance of the examina-
tion and preparation of the report.
Standards of Field Work
1. The work is to be adequately planned and assistants, if any, are to be prop-
erly supervised.
2. There is to be a proper study and evaluation of the existing internal control
as a basis for reliance thereon and for the determination of the resultant ex-
tent of the tests to which auditing procedures are to be restricted.
3. Sufficient competent evidential matter is to be obtained through inspection,
observation, inquiries, and confirmations to afford a reasonable basis for opin-
ion regarding the financial statements under examination.
Standards of Reporting
1. The report shall state whether the financial statements are presented in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
2. The report shall state whether such principles have been consistently ob-
served in the current period in relation to the preceding period.
3. Informative disclosure in the financial statements are to be regarded as
reasonably adequate unless otherwise stated in the report.
4. The report shall either contain an expression of opinion regarding the fi-
nancial statements, taken as a whole, or an assertion to the effect that an
opinion cannot be expressed. When an overall opinion cannot be expressed,
the reasons therefore should be stated. In all cases where an auditor's name is
associated with financial statements, the report should contain a clear-cut in-
dication of the character of the auditor's examination, if any, and the degree
of responsibility he is taking.
Fiflis, supra note 3, at 40 n.24.
50. See United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1006 (1970), where the court held that an accountant's compliance with the gen-
erally accepted accounting standards was not conclusive evidence that he acted in good
faith. This was the first time that such compliance did not provide an accountant com-
plete protection from liability. See also Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath &
Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd in part and rev'd in part, 540
F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976). For excellent discussions of the issue, see Adams, Lessening the
Legal Liability of Auditors, 32 Bus. LAW 1037 (1977); Lantry, Thor Power Tool Co.
v. C.I.R. Further Erodes CPA's Defense of Observing Professional Standards, 19 AM.
Bus. L. J. 87 (1981); Solomon, Who Judges the Auditor, and How?, J. ACCT. 67 (Aug.
1976); Volz, Accountants' Liability to Third Persons: Resistance in Negligence, 9
BARRISTER 31 (Fall 1982). See generally Fiflis, supra note 3, at 62-87; Solomon, UI-
tramares Revisited: A Modern Study of Accountants Liability to the Public, 18 DE
PAUL L. REV. 56, 58 (1968); Weiner, supra note 1, at 239 n.19.
13
Paschall: Paschall: Liability to Non-Clients
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1988
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
picture of the firm.5' In determining whether the accountant performed care-
fully, the trier of fact must consider his actual behavior in relationship to a
number of factors, including the customs and practices of the profession and
the standards of the particular firm. Expert testimony or journal articles on
the particular issue are also helpful. 5'
The plaintiff must also demonstrate that the representations by the ac-
countant played a material and substantial role in leading him to decide as he
did. This requirement is often difficult to substantiate since the typical investor
relies on a number of factors in making a decision. 53 Further, such reliance
must also have been justifiable. In this regard, the plaintiff's conduct will be
judged against that of a reasonable person or entity under similar
circumstances.
4
The very nature of accounting services leaves open the possibility that
mistakes will not cause financial loss. In fact, third parties' suits only arise
when they have lost money because of the inability of the accountant's client
to honor his financial commitment. Most courts hold the accountant liable for
the actual loss suffered by the plaintiff as a result of his negligence.5 5 All juris-
dictions require that financial loss be established with reasonable certainty.
The final hurdle for the plaintiff is demonstrating that the accountant's
negligence caused the financial loss. This requires proof of cause in fact, i.e.,
that "but for" the accountant's negligence there would have been no financial
loss. Additionally, the plaintiff must demonstrate proximate cause, 56 that is,
51. See McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Del. 1976); Herzfeld, 378
F. Supp. at 121.
52. See Fiflis, supra note 3, at 65-66.
53. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 108, at 749-54; see also Besser, supra
note 7, at 538.
54. For a discussion of the role that the plaintiff's conduct has in a suit against
the accountant, see Menzel, The Defense of Contributory Negligence in Accountant's
Malpractice Actions, 13 SETON HALL 292 (1983). See generally supra note 17.
55. See Bonhiver v. Graff, 311 Minn. 111, 248 N.W.2d 291 (1976); see also
Mesh, A Basic Approach to Accountants' Liability, 4 J. TRIAL ADVOc. 297, 307-08
(1980). See generally Comment, Third Party Liability for Negligence - The Account-
ant's Price for Producing a Reliable Commodity, 14 U. TOL. L. REv. 1371, 1394-96
(1983) [hereinafter Comment, Accountant's Price; Mesh, A Basic Approach to Ac-
countants' Liability, 4 J. TRIAL ADVoc. 297, 307-08 (1980).
56. See McDowell, supra note 45, at 300 n.53, where the author notes:
Some of the most difficult legal problems in tort occur in the element of cau-
sation. If the conduct of the defendant was tortious and there was damage
suffered by the plaintiff, was that damage proximately caused by the wrongful
act? Although the precise meaning of proximate cause is the subject of some
dispute, see Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 453-54, 107 N.W.2d 859, 860
(1961) ('There is no subject in the field of law upon which more has been
written with less elucidation than that of proximate cause.'), the determina-
tion of proximate cause turns on a combination of cause-in-fact, foreseeability
of ensuing events, and the existence of independent intervening causes occur-
ring between defendant's breach of a tort duty and plaintiff's damage, See
Texas & Pacific Ry. v. McCleery, 418 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tex. 1967) (using
[Vol. 53
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that the defendant could foresee the plaintiff's loss.
Such foreseeability is not only involved in proof causation. It also is uti-
lized in determining whether the accountant owed a legal duty to the plaintiff.
If the defendant could not have foreseen the likelihood of injury to a particular
individual as a result of his negligent conduct, then he owes no legal duty to
that individual.57 Which particular third parties are, in fact, foreseeable users
of the accountant's work product is a policy decision that determines the ex-
tent of the accountant's liability. This issue is the focus of the current debate
surrounding accountant's liability to third parties.
THE EVOLUTION OF ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY IN THIRD PARTY
TRANSACTIONS: FROM "PRIVITY" TO "REASONABLE FORESIGHT"
Historically, courts have been reluctant to allow a third party to recover
in a negligence action without a direct contractual relationship between the
third party and the defendant.58 This doctrine was established in the 1842
English case Winterbottom v. Wainwright,59 in which the hired driver of a
stage-coach was injured when the coach overturned because of a defectively
manufactured part. The court decided that the manufacturer owed a duty to
only the owner of the coach to keep it maintained and in good repair:
If the plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any person passing along the
road, who was injured by the upsetting of the coach, might bring a similar
action. Unless we confine the operations of such contracts as this to the par-
ties who entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to
which I can see no limit, would ensue.60
'but-for' test to determine whether or not a train's excessive speed was proxi-
mate cause of collision).
Id. The very nature of the accounting profession causes problems in determining proxi-
mate cause, especially when the accountant/client relationship has existed over an ex-
tended period of time. Determining the specific occurrence which gives rise to a pecuni-
ary loss is often important in regard to insurance coverage. See Comment,
Accountant's Price, supra note 55, at 1395-96.
57. Foreseeability is a dominant aspect of tort analysis. McDowell, supra note
45, at 301-02, proposes the following definition of foreseeability:
Foreseeability is such awareness of the serious possibility that harmful conse-
quences would ensue from a projected action that a reasonable and decent
person would either choose to act in a way that avoids such harm or else
could not voluntarily accept responsibility for the consequences of such harm.
A foresighted person sees into the future and takes necessary precautions to
protect himself and others while taking advantage of opportunities.
Id. at 290. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100
(1928) for Cardozo's classic statement, "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the
duty to be obeyed. . . ." See also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 92, at 665.
58. For a discussion of the development of the privity doctrine, see Besser, supra
note 7, at 510-12 n.15.
59. 10 M & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
60. Id. at -, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405.
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The practical effect of liability commensurate with specific contractual accept-
ance of risk was to protect emerging industrial and commercial enterprises.
The possibility that a manufacturer could be forced into bankruptcy by liabil-
ity suits outweighed the desire to compensate injured consumers. 61 Only in an
exceptional circumstance (for instance, in Thomas v. Winchester, 2 where a
vendor was held liable to a third party for the mislabeling of a toxic drug) was
the limitation of privity not followed. 3
This precedent stood until 1916, when the New York court of appeals
decided MacPherson v. Buick Motors,"' the first of a number of landmark
decisions by that court involving the law of torts. The court disposed of the
privity doctrine by allowing the plaintiff, the purchaser of an automobile, to go
beyond his contract with the dealer and sue the manufacturer for injuries he
received as a result of a negligently manufactured wheel.65 The new view, as
stated by Judge Cardozo, was that a duty of reasonable care was created by
the foreseeability of injury rather than by a contractual relationship. 6 Practi-
cal concerns for human life and public safety became paramount.
If there is knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other than the
purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the man-
ufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully. If [a
manufacturer] is negligent, where danger is to be foreseen, a liability will
follow. 67
The same court, six years later, expanded the rationale of MacPherson in
61. Note, Contemporary Approach, supra note 7, at 412; see Note, Accountants
Liability, supra note 7, at 569; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 96, at 642.
62. 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
63. See, e.g., Davidson v. Nichols, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 514, 516, 518 (1866)
(buyer may not recover from wholesaler who mislabeled chemical when mixture of
such harmless chemical with another caused explosion and physical injury); Losee v.
Clute, 51 N.Y. 494, 496-97 (1873) (vendor not liable for damages to neighbors' homes
when defective boiler exploded in purchaser's basement); Curtin v. Somerset, 140 Pa.
70, 80, 21 A. 244, 245 (1891) (building contractor not liable to anyone but purchaser
when defective construction of house caused injuries). One court reviewed three excep-
tions to the general privity rule: where the negligent act is imminently dangerous to life
or limb and done in the preparation of a life-saving product; where the owner's negli-
gence injures one invited to use a defective product; or where the vendor knows that the
product is imminently dangerous yet conceals the defect or fails to give notice of it.
Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865, 870-72 (8th Cir. 1903) (conceal-
ment of known defect by manufacturer which makes product imminently dangerous
results in liability for injuries despite lack of privity); Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470,
478 (1882) (contractor liable to painter's employees for injuries resulting from negli-
gently constructed scaffolding).
64. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
65. Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
66. Id. This case was a major turning point in products liability law. Mess, supra
note 1, at 840. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377
P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
67. MacPherson, 217 N.Y. at 389-90, 111 N.E. at 1053.
[Vol. 53
16
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 4 [1988], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol53/iss4/7
ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY
Glanzer v. Shepard.68 Glanzer was the first case to allow a third party plaintiff
to recover in negligence when the only damage was financial loss. 69 In that
case, the defendant was a public weigher who had been hired by a bean
merchant to certify the weight of the beans the merchant was selling to the
plaintiff buyer. The buyer, who overpaid when the weights were negligently
overstated, sued the weigher. Judge Cardozo, speaking for the court,
concluded
The plaintiff's use of the certificates was not an indirect or collateral conse-
quence of the action of the weighers. It was a consequence which, to the
weighers' knowledge, was the end and aim of the transaction. The defendants
held themselves out to the public as skilled and careful in their calling. They
knew that beans had been old, and that on the faith of their certificate pay-
ment would be made. They sent a copy to the plaintiffs for the very purpose
of inducing action. In such circumstances, assumption of the task of weighing
was the assumption of the duty to weigh carefully for benefit of all whose
conduct was to be governed. We do not need to state the duty in terms of
contract or of privity. Growing out of a contract, it has nonetheless an origin
not exclusively contractual. Given the contract and the relation, the duty is
imposed by law.7
0
Again in 1928, the New York court of appeals decided an important case
to the developing concept of duty in tort, Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroada'
The issue before the court was the scope of a negligent defendant's liability;
that is, the specific class of plaintiffs that the defendant was obligated to com-
pensate. In Palsgraf, the defendant's coachman acted negligently by helping a
passenger board a moving train. When the passenger inadvertently dropped
his parcel, which contained fireworks, an explosion resulted. The plaintiff,
standing on the platform about twenty-five feet away, was injured, but the
defendant was not legally responsible.72 The case concluded that a defendant's
68. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
69. See Mess, supra note 1, at 841; Besser, supra note 7, at 513. Courts have
historically afforded less protection to pecuniary loss than to loss for physical injury.
See James, Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: A
Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAN. L. REV. 43, 50-51 (1972) explaining that this reluctance
to compensate for financial loss is based on crude and unreliable "pragmatic" objec-
tions, i.e., courts' fear. The effect of finding the defendant liable - rather than any of
"the physical consequences of negligence usually have been limited, but not the indirect
economic repercussions of negligence may far be wider, indeed virtually open-ended."
Id. at 45. See also Comment, Foreseeability of Third Party Economic Injuries - A
Problem in Analysis, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 283 (1953); Comment, Union Oil Co. v.
Oppen: Recovery of a Purely Economic Loss in Negligence, 60 IOWA L. REv. 315
(1974). See James & Gray, Misrepresentation - Part 1, 37 MD. L. REV. 286, 307 n.6
(1977) for a discussion of the reluctance of English courts to compensate for pecuniary
loss. See Hawkins, supra note 23, at 814 n.77 for a discussion of the abrogation of the
privity rule in early cases of pecuniary loss.
70. 233 N.Y. at 238-39, 135 N.E. at 275-76.
71. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
72. Id. at 340-41, 162 N.E. at 99.
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liability extends only to foreseeable plaintiffs."3
This triad of cases marked a significant shift in the law: the restrictive
contract theory of privity was being phased out as a requirement to recover for
either physical or pecuniary loss. It was being replaced by a liability-ex-
panding tort theory of negligence. 74 Individual responsibility was no longer de-
termined by the bounds of an agreement, but expanded to include third parties
whom the defendant could foresee would be affected by the negligent opera-
tion of his or her services. Based on the logic inherent in these precedents, it
seemed that the responsibility of public accountants would run beyond their
direct clients to certain third parties who relied on the accountants' audited
statements. 5
THE Ultramares STANDARD: CONFLICTING PRECEDENT?
Nevertheless, in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche Ross & Co.,76 the New
York court of appeals disallowed a negligence suit against an accounting firm
by a plaintiff who had neither contractual privity nor a relationship "so close
as to approach that of privity. ' '7
In Ultramares, Fred Stern and Company hired the defendant certified
public accountants to perform an audit of its financial condition.78 The ac-
countants' balance sheet reported that the company had assets exceeding one
million dollars when, in fact, the company was insolvent.79 This discrepancy
was due to the overvaluation of assets through the use of fictitious and non-
existent accounts receivable which the accountants negligently failed to sub-
stantiate.80 Plaintiff Ultramares, relying on the balance sheet, lent Stern
money and suffered a loss when the company declared bankruptcy. 1 Touche
was aware of the fact that Stern & Co., as part of their ongoing business
activity, would be soliciting loans based on the audit that Touche performed. 8
The defendant supplied its client with thirty-two copies for dispersal.83
Touche, however, did not know that Ultramares specifically would see the bal-
ance sheets. 84 When Ultramares sued the accounting firm for negligence, the
court faced the task of either exposing the accounting profession to the
73. Id. at 345, 162 N.E. at 101. See supra note 57.
74. Besser, supra note 2, at 514; see also Note, Contemporary Approach, supra
note 7, at 410.
75. Besser, supra note 2, at 514; Weiner, supra note 1, at 243; Note, Contempo-
rary Approach, supra note 7, at 410.
76. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
77. Id. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 446. See generally supra note 11.
78. 255 N.Y. at 173, 174 N.E. at 442.
79. Id. at 174-75, 174 N.E. at 442.
80. Id. at 175, 174 N.E. at 442-43.
81. Id. at 175-76, 174 N.E. at 443.
82. Id. at 173-74, 174 N.E. at 442.
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possibility of extensive liability or of distinguishing the line of precedent estab-
lished in Glanzer and MacPherson.8"
Cardozo distinguished the cases,86 noting that in Glanzer:
[There] was something more than the rendition of a service in the expectation
that the one who ordered the certificate would use it thereafter in the opera-
tions of his business as occasion might require. Here was a case where the
transmission of the certificate to another was not merely one possibility
among many, but the "end and aim of the transaction." In a word, the service
rendered by defendant in Glanzer v. Shepard was primarily for the informa-
tion of a third person, in effect, if not in name, a party to the contract, and
only incidentally for that of the formal promisee. In the case at hand, the
service was primarily for the benefit of the Stern Company and only inciden-
tally or collaterally for the use of those to whom Stern and his associates
might exhibit it thereafter.8
7
Glanzer and Ultramares "best exemplify the conflicting precedent for ex-
tending liability for breach of contract to third parties." 88 Cardozo felt that
the relationship between the weigher and the buyer in Glanzer created a bond
"so close as to approach that of privity although not identical to it."89 In Ul-
tramares, on the other hand, the beneficiaries of the accountant-client contract
were more remotely removed.90 Although Touche could have foreseen the pos-
sible reliance of a number of parties, neither the "who" nor the "when" was
certain. This distinction leaves open an accountant's liability to a third party
if, for example, the accountant knew that the audit, although paid for by the
client, would be given to a specific third party who would rely on it. In such a
case, the "end aim" of the transaction would be the third party's acquisition of
the accounting statements. 91
85. See Note, Contemporary Approach, supra note 7, at 410 where the author
comments:
After MacPherson and Glanzer, the defense of privity to an action in negli-
gence appeared to be all but dead. Cardozo's language in those opinions was
not only unequivocal, but devoid of any limitation imposed by the law of con-
tract. The duty of the defendant to the injured plaintiff was enlarged beyond
the "bounds" of his contractual obligations by his "knowledge of a prospective
use."
According to the author, the Ultramares court recognized that "the assault upon the
citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace," yet went on to distinguish the acts
of accountants as merely "the circulation of a thought or a release of the explosive
power resident in words." Id. (quoting Ultramares, 255 N.Y at 180-81, 174 N.E. at
445).
86. For a further discussion of the distinction drawn by Justice Cardozo, see Bes-
ser, supra note 7, at 514; Mess, supra note 1, at 843-44; Weiner, supra note 1, at 242-
44.
87. 255 N.Y. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 445-46.
88. Bilek, supra note 21, at 692.
89. 255 N.Y. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 446.
90. Id. at 183, 174 N.E. at 446; see also Besser, supra note 7, at 515; Weiner,
supra note 1, at 243.
91. Although this is a logical conclusion from Cardozo's opinion, courts inter-
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Legal scholars have criticized Cardozo's Ultramares position as artificial
and inconsistent with his prior decisions.92 Certainly, Ultramares' use of an
audit was foreseeable since the audit was intended to be used by third party
creditors. Hence, a duty was owed to each of the thirty-two recipients of the
Stern audit despite the fact that each had not been identified. The accountant
could have foreseen that his negligent act could injure the plaintiff in some
way.93
When subtle distinctions are used to substantiate a decision that counters
a distinct trend in the case law, policy considerations often play an important
role. Ultramares reflects a very different view of the accounting profession and
its relationship to the business community. At the time of the decision in 1931,
the accounting profession was not the powerful, prestigious entity that it is
today. The public accountant was little known and little recognized because
"the matters which were referred to him at that time were relatively unimpor-
tant, and this unimportance tended to reduce him to the level of a clerk."'"
The accountant's product was intended for the benefit of his client - to
inform managers of any inefficiencies or irregularities in the business while
any use beyond this by third parties was merely incidental.95 This perspective
is reflected in Cardozo's statement that "public accountants are public only in
the sense that their services are offered to anyone who chooses to employ
preted Ultramares as barring all negligence suits against accountants where a privity
relationship did not exist. See infra notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., Besser, supra note 7, at 516-17 (accountants' duty should expand
to correspond to their expanded functions); Fiflis, supra note 3, at 107 (Ultramares
obsolete because of "current public service status" of accountants); Mess, supra note 1,
at 843; see also Solomon, supra note 50, at 74-75 (arguing that Cardozo was imprecise
when he asserted that services rendered by public accountants are primarily for benefit
of client and that they are "public" only in the sense that they offer their services to
anyone who chooses to employ them); Weiner, supra note 1, at 249-53 (privity require-
ment does not account for important function CPAs fulfill in economy); Note, Contem-
porary Approach, supra note 7, at 401 (privity shield is inapplicable to the modern,
sophisticated business world); Note, Public Accountants and Attorneys: Negligence
and the Third Party, 47 NOTRE DAME L. 588, 602-07 (1972) (discussing policy reasons
for extension of liability).
93. See Mess, supra note 1, at 843 where the author concludes that "the harm
which befell the plaintiff was a reasonably foreseeable risk, which the accounting firm
could be expected to have foreseen would be the result of a negligently prepared re-
port." See also Besser, supra note 7, at 515 n.33. See generally supra note 57.
94. CAREY, supra note 7, at 34; see also Mess, supra note 1, at 839. "Account-
ants performed substantially less work per audit than they do today," and the profes-
sion, as a whole, was much less sophisticated. Id. See Note, Contemporary Approach,
supra note 7, at 405-06. See generally Fiflis, supra note 3, at 105.
95. Comment, Auditors Responsibility for Misrepresentation: Inadequate Pro-
tection for Users of Financial Statements, 44 WASH. L. REv. 139, 178 (1968) ("as
ownership and management of business separated, it became necessary for corporate
owners to review the performance of corporate managers"); see also Besser, supra note
7, at 531-32; Bilek, supra note 21, at 692; Fiflis, supra note 3, at 105-06; Note, Ac-
countant's Liability, supra note 7, at 564-65.
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them.""" Since during this era the standards governing corporate financial re-
ports were relatively primitive, an "auditor was more likely to miss discrepan-
cies in a client's records," 97 and third parties who received the accountant's
audit were aware that such discrepancies might exist.98 In fact, as late as
1938, the New York Society of Certified Public Accountants permitted an
auditor to rely on statements by management regarding the cost and accuracy
of inventory items.99 Also, during this time, third-party investors were a
smaller, generally more well-informed group than they are today. For these
reasons, Cardozo did not view the accounting profession as owing a responsi-
bility to the public to perform its work with due care. Such a duty flowed only
to those who paid for the service.1 °
Perhaps the most crucial factor in Cardozo's position was his fear that the
accounting profession, at the time a fledgling industry, could be destroyed by
96. 255 N.Y. at 188, 174 N.E. at 448.
97. Note, Contemporary Approach, supra note 7, at 405.
98. Cardozo suggested in Ultramares, "[w]e doubt whether the average business
man receiving a certificate without paying for it and receiving it merely as one among a
multitude of possible investors, would look for anything more" than that the ensuing
liability for negligence is bounded by the contract, and in the absence of fraud, is to be
enforced between the parties by whom the contract has been made. 255 N.Y. at 189,
174 N.E. at 448. This view of the role of the public accountant, perhaps accurate in
1931, is no longer valid today. In the words of Justice Weiner, an accountant has be-
come a "high priest willing for a fee to translate, through the added mystique of com-
puter software, the jargon of almost incomprehensible financial transactions into neat,
tabulated and word-processed form .... ." Weiner, supra note 1, at 235. See generally
supra note 7.
99. Note, Contemporary Approach, supra note 7, at 405. The author notes that:
The mandated auditing standards and procedures were not improved until
1940, when the SEC issued an accounting release concerning the McKesson
& Robbins case. The SEC criticized the accountants for inaccuracies in the
corporation's audited financial statements and set forth several findings. First,
the accounting firm "failed to employ that degree of vigilance, inquisitiveness,
and analysis of the evidence available that is necessary in a professional un-
dertaking and is recommended in all well-known and authoritative works on
auditing.
Id. (citations omitted). Second, although the accounting profession claims that the au-
ditor is not a guarantor and should not be liable for fraud, the SEC ruled that "the
discovery of gross overstatements in the accounts is a major purpose of such an audit
even though it be conceded that [the audit] might not disclose every minor defalca-
tion." Id. Third, the SEC advised the accounting profession to take physical inventories
and to require confirmations of accounts and notes receivable. Finally, it recommended
that the board of directors nominate the auditors and that the activities of management
be included in the audit. The SEC also made recommendations to the American Insti-
tute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). It suggested that the AICPA distin-
guish auditing "standards" from auditing "procedures," and that the auditor's certifi-
cate should state whether "the audit was made in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards applicable in the circumstances." Subsequently, the AICPA
adopted these procedures and eventually codified them in the Statement on Auditing
Standards. Note, Contemporary Approach, supra note 7, at 405-06.
100. 255 N.Y. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448.
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the economic impact of extensive liability. This, in turn, would hinder the cap-
ital markets that relied on audited financial statements. 10 1 Hence, restricting
the scope of an auditor's liability within a narrowly prescribed framework was
preferable to exposing accountants to "liability in an indeterminate amount for
an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. '10 2 In retrospect, the decision
far exceeded its objective of protecting the industry until it became sufficiently
strong to pay for the consequences of its mistakes.
1 0 3
Another of Cardozo's concerns was that a decision for the plaintiff could
set a precedent for imposing liability on lawyers, title companies, and others in
the business of transferring information." 4 At the time of the Ultramares de-
cision, these groups were not liable to third parties. Thus, although a decision
to expand accountant's liability beyond that contained in a contract would
have been a logical legal step, Cardozo felt that the economic and social conse-
quences warranted the deferral of the decision to the legislature.101
101. Comment, Rosemblum v. Adler: Auditors' Liability for Negligent Misrep-
resentation - "The Explosive Power Resident in Words," 38 U. MIAMI L. REv. 939,
940-41 (1984) [hereinafter Comment, Rosenblum v. Adler]. In support of his position,
Cardozo cited Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 164, 159 N.E. 896,
897 (1928). Moch Co. also involved an important fledgling industry, public water-
works, that could have been greatly hampered by expansive liability. See Seavey, supra
note 92, at 392; see also Besser, supra note 1, at 534; Katsoris, Accountants' Third
Party Liability - How Far Do We Go ?, 36 FORDHAM L. REv. 191, 204-05 (1967);
Meek, Liability of the Accountant to Parties Other Than His Employer, 1942 Wis. L,
REv. 371, 389; Comment, Auditors' Responsibility, supra note 7, at 180.
102. 255 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
103. The accounting industry is now very powerful and prosperous. See generally
supra notes 7-8, and infra note 158.
104. Cardozo reflected in Ultramares:
Liability for negligence if adjudged in this case will extend to many callings
other than an auditor's. Lawyers who certify their opinion as to the validity of
municipal or corporate bonds, with knowledge that the opinion will be
brought to the notice of the public, will become liable to the investors, if they
have overlooked a statute or a decision, to the same extent as if the contro-
versy were one between client and advisor. Title companies insuring titles to a
tract of land, with knowledge that at an approaching auction the fact that
they have insured will be stated to the bidders, will become liable to purchas-
ers who may wish the benefit of a policy without payment of a premium.
These illustrations may seem to be extreme, but they go little, if any, farther
than we are invited to go now.
255 N.Y. at 188, 174 N.E. at 448.
105. Id. at 187, 174 N.E. at 447. "A change so revolutionary, if expedient, must
be wrought by legislation." Id. Although Cardozo left the decision as to whether or not
to allow liability for accountants without privity to the legislature, "no state legislature
has done so." Weiner, supra note 1, at 236 n.10. Nevertheless, "in the light of the
economic maturation of the independent accounting profession,... dependence on ...
judicial solitude seems ill-advised." Bradley, supra note 8, at 921; see also Fiflis, supra
note 3, at 105.
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APPLYING THE Ultramares DOCTRINE
Although Cardozo, in distinguishing Ultramares from Glanzer, left room
for third-party recovery if the service was rendered for the primary benefit of
the plaintiff (when the plaintiff's acquisition of the information was the "end
and aim" of the transaction), later decisions ignored this distinction.0 6 The
first case to interpret Ultramares, O'Conner v. Ludlum,107 concluded, "[s]ince
there was no contractual relationship between the plaintiffs and the defend-
ants, liability could be imposed only for fraud ... a mistake in the balance
sheet, even if it were the result of negligence, could not be the basis of a
recovery."' 18 The New York court of appeals reached a similar result in State
Street Trust Co. v. Ernst,09 decided seven years after Ultramares. In this
case, despite the fact that the accountant knew that the third-party plaintiff
intended to rely on his audit in deciding whether to make a loan to the client,
the court decided that the accountant could not be liable "in the absence of a
contractual relationship or its equivalent." 0 Consequently, Ultramares came
to represent the rule that without contractual privity there could be no recov-
ery by plaintiffs against accountants for their negligence. This perspective pre-
vailed for over thirty years in every jurisdiction in which the issue arose, and
today remains the law in a number of states."'
Recently, the New York court of appeals in Credit Alliance Corp. v. Ar-
thur Andersen & Co."' reexamined the issue of an auditor's liability to a third
party lender. The court reaffirmed its reliance on the Ultramares standard,
finding that the facts failed "to demonstrate the existence of a relationship
between the parties sufficiently approaching privity."'n The court developed a
three-prong test for holding an accountant may be liable in negligence to a
noncontractual party who had detrimentally relied on inaccurate financial
statements. These three requirements are: (1) the accountant must have been
aware that the financial reports were to be used for a particular purpose or
purposes; (2) the accountant must have known that a party or parties would
rely on the financial reports; and (3) there must have been some conduct on
the part of the accountant linking him to the party or parties which evinces
the accountant's understanding of their reliance." 4
106. In addition to the cases cited in the text and supra note 11, see, e.g., Nor-
tex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 532 F.2d 1013, 1015 (5th Cir. 1976); MacNerland
v. Barnes, 129 Ga. App. 367, 370-71, 199 S.E.2d 564, 566 (1973). For other cases with
similar holdings, see Annotation, Liability of Public Accountant to Third Parties, 46
A.L.R.3D 979, 991-94 (1972).
107. 92 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1937).
108. Id. at 53.
109. 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938).
110. Id. at 111, 15 N.E.2d 419.
111. See supra note 11 for a list of the states and prevailing cases.
112. 65 N.Y.2d 536, 483 N.E.2d 110, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1985).
113. Id. at 553, 483 N.E.2d at 119, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 444.
114. Id. at 551, 483 N.E.2d at 118, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 443. For an analysis of the
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This modern interpretation of Ultramares seems to represent Cardozo's
intentions when he wrote the opinion years ago. Third-party recovery for an
accountant's negligence is possible, but only in the narrow and specific circum-
stances in which the accountant has acted upon knowledge that the third party
bringing the suit will rely on the audit in making a business decision involving
the client.
Toro Co. v. Krouse, Kern & Co.,115 decided according to Indiana case
law, is the most recent case to apply the Ultramares doctrine. The facts are
similar to the cases above. Krouse prepared yearly audit reports for Summit
Power Equipment Distributors, Inc. (Summit). 16 Summit bought equipment
from the Toro Company and received credit from Toro Credit Company,
Toro's wholly owned subsidiary." 7 When Toro required audited reports from
Summit in order to evaluate its financial condition, Summit supplied those
prepared by auditor Krouse. 1" 8 These statements, negligently prepared, over-
stated Summit's assets." 9 Relying on the inaccurate reports, Toro extended
credit to Summit. 20 When Summit was unable to repay, Toro brought suit
against Krouse. The district court, in denying recovery to Toro, concluded that
there was no evidence that Krouse had the necessary contact with Toro which
demonstrated Krouse's understanding of Toro's actual reliance on the reports
Krouse furnished to Summit.' 2 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
upheld the lower court's decision:
[I]n those areas where privity still applies, there exists an "actual knowledge"
exception. However, this "actual knowledge" exception is a very narrow and
specific one. It requires proof that the defendant had actual knowledge that
the particular person or entity bringing the law suit "would rely on the infor-
mation given." In short, the Indiana courts have made a "distinction between
knowledge that a third party will rely on the opinion given and an expectation
that unidentified others might rely on it." We further believe that the district
court was correct when it held that this "actual knowledge" exception to the
privity rule was the functional equivalent of the Ultramares test's insistence
on "near privity."'12 2
discussion, see Note, New York Upholds Ultramares, supra note 3, at 1034-40. See
also White v. Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d 356, 361-62, 372 N.E.2d 315, 318-19, 401
N.Y.S.2d 474, 477-78 (1977).
115. 827 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1987).





121. 644 F. Supp. 986, 994 (N.D. Ind. 1986).
122. 827 F.2d at 161.
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DEPARTURE FROM Ultramares: THE Restatement STANDARD OF THE
. FOR18SEEN
The first case to depart from Ultramares and allow a non-privity plaintiff
to recover against an accountant for negligence was Rusch Factors, Inc. v.
Levin, '2 decided by the United States District Court for Rhode Island in
1968. In response to a request by the plaintiff (a prospective creditor), a
Rhode Island corporation hired an auditor to evaluate its financial stability.
The defendant accountant knew that the plaintiff would base its credit deci-
sion on the accountant's financial statement. 24 Relying on the validity of the
prepared statements, plaintiff lent over $330,000 to the corporation. When the
corporation subsequently went into receivership, plaintiff brought a tort action
against the accountant. 25 Applying Rhode Island law, the court held that lack
of privity should not prevent recovery when the third party was part of a "lim-
ited class" of potential financiers of the corporation whose reliance was "actu-
ally foreseen" by defendant. 26 The court concluded that "the case at bar is
qualitatively distinguishable from Ultramares"' 27 and governed instead by
Glanzer since "the defendant knew that his certification was to be used for,
and had as its very aim and purpose, the reliance of potential financiers of the
corporation. 128
To support its argument the court used the position of the then recently
completed draft of the Restatement of Torts, which permits recovery to those
who can be actually foreseen as parties who will and do rely upon the financial
statements. 129 The objective of the Restatement, a product of legal practition-
ers working under the auspices of the American Law Institute, is to synthesize
judicial viewpoints on particular issues. It limits the liability of a professional
who has made a negligent misrepresentation to loss suffered:
(a)by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and
guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient
intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information
to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar
transaction.!'"
123. 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968).
124. Id. at 91.
125. Id. at 86-87.
126. Id. at 92-93.
127. Id. at 91. The court criticized Ultramares, concluding that it constituted an
unreasonable inroad upon the rule that the risk perceived defines the duty owed. Id.
128. Id. at 93.
129. Id. at 90-92.
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2)(a), (b) (1977). The full text of
§ 552 is as follows:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or
in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false
information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject
to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon
19881
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The Restatement, then, allows for a wider range of possible plaintiffs.
Whereas Ultramares requires that the auditor know specifically the third
party who acts in reliance, the Restatement allows unidentified parties to re-
cover if they are members of a class that the auditor knows his client intends
to supply with information. The key element in this view is the accountant's
knowledge that his information would be communicated to a specifically iden-
tified individual or limited class of persons. 1 "
Shortly after Rusch, the Iowa Supreme Court found an accountant liable
when a specifically foreseen party relied on a negligently prepared financial
statement. 13 2 These cases were a departure from Ultramares and signified the
beginning of an expansion of the accountant's liability. Now the Restatement
view is the most commonly applied alternative to the privity doctrine. 33
The Rusch court left the question of whether an accountant's liability for
negligent misrepresentations should extend to the full limits of foreseeabil-
the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in ob-
taining or communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection
(1) is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit
and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient
intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the informa-
tion to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially
similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the informa-
tion extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit
the duty is created, in any of the transactions in which it is intended to pro-
tect them.
131. Comment (h) of the explanatory notes pertaining to § 552 provides that an
accountant's liability to non-privity parties is not limited to a specifically foreseen
plaintiff:
Under this Section .... it is not necessary that the maker should have any
particular person in mind as the intended, or even the probable, recipient of
the information .... It is sufficient, in other words, insofar as the plaintiff's
identity is concerned, that the maker knows that the maker supplies the infor-
mation for repetition to a certain group or class of persons and that the plain-
tiff proves to be one of them, even though the maker never had heard of him
by name when the information was given.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 comment h (1977). Compare § 552 comment
h with Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 238-39, 135 N.E. 275, 275 (1922) (bean
weigher liable because he actually knew the identity of relying buyer). The Restate-
ment position would allow recovery to an unidentified third party as long as that third
party was a member of an identified class of persons whose reliance the accountant
could foresee. See Besser, supra note 7, at 524-25 (Restatement extends liability to
class actually foreseen by accountant as opposed to person specifically foreseen).
132. Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969).
133. See supra notes 10 & 13 and accompanying text; see also Note, H. Rosen-
blum, Inc. v. Adler: A Foreseeably Unreasonable Extension of an Auditor's Legal
Duty, 48 ALB. L. REV. 876, 889 (1984).
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ity."' For years courts interpreted the case narrowly, dismissing negligence
suits against accountants in which the plaintiff's reliance was foreseeable
rather than specifically foreseen.Y35
THE REASONABLY FORESEEABLE: FROM Rosenblum v. Adler TO
Touche Ross v. Commercial Union
In 1983, in Rosenblum v. Adler,"16 the New Jersey Supreme Court set
new precedent, expanding the liability of accountants to third parties whose
reliance on audited financial statements was reasonably foreseeable.
In Rosenblum, a Massachusetts corporation which operated discount de-
partment stores, hired the defendant accounting firm of Touche Ross & Com-
pany to prepare an audit of the corporation's financial situationY.37 Plaintiff
Rosenblum, which operated retail catalogue showrooms, was interested in
merging with Giant and relied on Touche's unqualified opinion in making its
decision."3 The two companies reached an agreement in which Rosenblum
sold its operations to Giant in exchange for Giant common stock. 139 When
Giant subsequently filed for bankruptcy, Rosenblum's stock became worth-
less." 0 Rosenblum sued, alleging that Touche was negligent in failing to detect
a large-scale management fraud when it audited Giant's books.' 4 ' After con-
sidering the various public policy concerns and the legal environment in which
the auditor operated, the court rejected the limitations on accountant's third-
party liability imposed by Ultramares and the Restatement. Instead, the court
held that when an independent auditor furnished an opinion without any limi-
tation as to whom the audited company may disseminate the financial state-
ments, he has a duty to all reasonably foreseeable third parties who rely on the
statements reviewed from the company for a "proper business purpose.""' 2
"Stockholders, potential investors, creditors, and potential creditors" were con-
sidered by the court to be reasonably foreseeable third parties."
134. 284 F. Supp. 93; see also Gormeley, supra note 10, at 548-49.
135. Besser, supra note 7, at 520. "[N]one of the courts which stepped away
from the pre-1960 mechanical application of Ultramares was compelled to forge new
law. In each case, the injured party was specifically known by the accountant to be the
intended user of the audit. The party was, in short, the 'primary beneficiary' contem-
plated by Glanzer." Id. See also Gormeley, supra note 10, at 549.
136. 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983).
137. Id. at 330, 461 A.2d at 140-41.
138. Id. at 330, 461 A.2d at 141. The opinion stated that "the financial state-
ments 'presented fairly' Grant's financial position." Id.
139. Id. at 331, 461 A.2d at 141.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 331-32, 461 A.2d at 141.
142. Id. at 352, 461 A.2d at 153.
143. See Note, CPA's Liability, supra note 21, at 335-36 n.4 where the author
notes:
The scope of this class will differ somewhat depending on the nature of the
audited client's business. For example, the reasonably foreseeable users of a
manufacturing company's financial statements may include suppliers of inven-
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Shortly after the New Jersey Supreme Court decision was handed down,
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Citizens State Bank v. Trim, Schmidt &
Co.' 4 followed the Rosenblum precedent. In this case, the plaintiff bank ex-
tended a loan to a company based on the negligently prepared financial state-
ment by the defendant's accountants.' 4 When the borrowing company fell
into receivership, the bank sued the accountants for negligence. The court held
that accountants, like any other tortfeasors, are fully liable for all the foresee-
able consequences of their negligent acts.1 41
In 1986, the California court of appeals also adopted this position when it
permitted recovery by a real estate developer who relied on negligently pre-
pared financial statements in entering into an agreement to purchase and sell
government loans.147 In its decision, the court rejected Ultramares as being
inconsistent with the fundamental principles of California negligence law and
also referred to the changing role of the independent auditor in today's
society.' 48
The most recent decision on the issue was handed down by the Mississippi
Supreme Court which, in Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union, 4 9 contin-
ued the trend begun by Rosenblum. Touche Ross, as an independent auditor
for Fidelity Bank, a state-chartered financial institution, knew that Fidelity
was insured against employee fraud with a "Banker's Blanket Bond" issued by
its carrier, United States Fidelity and Guaranty (USFG).'5 0 Touche also knew
that USFG could cancel its coverage with thirty days' notice. Four months
after completion of the audit, USFG did, in fact, terminate the agreement.,
In seeking out other insurers, Fidelity showed these insurers the financial
statements audited by Touche Ross.' 5' Commercial Union relied on these
statements, which were negligently prepared, in making its decision to extend
coverage.'5 3 Commercial Union asserted that it would never have extended
tory who sell inventory to the company on credit, or others who factor the
company's accounts receivable. Those types of third party users of financial
statements, however, would probably not be reasonably foreseeable in the case
of a bank or financial institution.
144. 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361 (1983).
145. Id. at 378, 335 N.W.2d at 362.
146. Id. at 386-88, 335 N.W.2d at 366-67. For an analysis of the decision, see
Note, Recent Decisions: Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 22 DuQ. L.
REV. 1185 (1984).
147. International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 177 Cal.
App. 3d 806, 820-21, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218, 227 (1986).
148. 25 DUQ. L. REV. 287 n.29. For a more detailed discussion, see Note, Inter-
national Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp.: Third Party Liability -
Accountants Beware, 18 PAc. L.J. 1055 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Accountants
Beware].
149. 514 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 1987).
150. Id. at 321.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 323.
153. Id. at 316.
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coverage to Fidelity if the financial statements had disclosed, as they should
have, Fidelity's activities in violation of the GAAP.154
Touche Ross would not have been liable under Ultramares since they did
not know of Commercial Union's reliance nor under the Restatement position
since they did not supply Fidelity with information for Commercial Union's
benefit and guidance. But the court followed Rosenblum, upholding the lower
court's finding that Touche Ross, under these circumstances, should have "rea-
sonably foreseen that an entity such as Commercial Union Insurance Com-
pany" might rely on the audit.'5 5
Investors, creditors, vendors, and insurers regularly rely on audits conducted
by independent examiners for a variety of purposes. Though reasonably fore-
seeable users of the audit, they are too often excluded from any recovery,
despite losses, because of the negligent auditor's limited immunity from a
third party's suit .... The court finds that an independent auditor is liable to
reasonably foreseeable users of the audit, who request and receive a financial
statement from the audited entity for a proper business purpose, and who
then detrimentally rely on the financial statement, suffering loss, proximately
caused by the auditor's negligence. Such a rule protects third parties, who
request, receive and rely on a financial statement, while it also protects the
auditor from an unlimited number of potential users, who may otherwise read
the financial statement, once published. 156
Clearly, the reasonably foreseeable standard represents a significant de-
parture from the restrictive view of Ultramares and the middle ground of the
Restatement. It effectively expands the class of persons to whom accountants
owe a legal responsibility. Touche, like Rosenblum, represent a trend toward
making the accountant's duties commensurate with their central roles in to-
day's business environment.15 7 Cardozo's policy considerations to protect ac-
countants from liability to third parties for negligence are now obsolete. While
once viewed as a clerk, the accountant today plays a vital role in maintaining
the integrity of sophisticated business transactions. Accounting is no longer a
profession in its infancy but one that flourishes financially and enjoys the sta-
tus and prestige often associated with the legal and medical fields. 58
154. Id.
155. Id. at 323.
156. Id. at 322-23.
157. "[lIt becomes a highly questionable practice to allow a profession to be
employed and gain the benefits of a position of trust, without insisting it assume the
responsibilities which accompany that position." Besser, supra note 7, at 533. See gen-
erally supra note 7.
158. See Mess, supra note 1, at 855. The author notes:
[A] reexamination of the assumptions and basis for Ultramares reveals that
the decision is no longer valid, and its result is that accountants today gener-
ally do not have legal responsibility for their professional conduct to match
their significant role in the modern business community. The accounting pro-
fession is not a new and developing profession in need of judicial protection,
nor are the standards of the profession in their formative years .... Finally,
the use of financial reports by third parties who are expected to rely on them
1988]
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THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION TODAY: EXPANDED LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY
The accountant's role in the operation of the American financial system
has expanded tremendously since the beginning of the twentieth century. 1 9
Initially, when businesses were customarily owned and managed by an individ-
ual or a limited number of partners, the role of the accountant was merely to
provide information to the owner(s) regarding the financial status of the busi-
ness. 160 However, as prosperity increased and the modern corporation
emerged, companies became dependent on outside investors to provide capital
beyond that which the owner could supply."' At the time of Ultramares, the
audit was still viewed primarily as a tool for management to entice investors
and obtain credit.1
8 2
The stock market crash in 1929 was responsible for a number of changes
in the regulation of the securities industry. Most notably, Congress intended in
the passage of federal securities law, in 1933 and 1934,L63 to implement a
policy of full disclosure to the public of relevant information regarding
corporate securities so that a buyer of stock would, in theory, have access to
the same information as the seller.'64 This legislation served as a tremendous
benefit to the accounting profession, especially in a business environment
where the amount of publicly offered stock was increasing. The demand for
audits and other accounting procedures increased sharply, as did the number
of individuals and institutions who received and relied on the information
which the accountant provided as an accurate and independent evaluation of a
is no longer a collateral matter to the preparation of the report for the client.
See also Note, Contemporary Approach, supra note 7, at 413 n.75. "[Tihe accounting
profession today needs little sympathy and should be treated as any other business." Id.
Weiner, supra note 1, at 250. "The fees charged by firms have risen commensurate
with the accountants' increased sophistication, and the complexity and the risk associ-
ated with their endeavors." Id. See generally supra notes 7-8.
159. Besser, supra note 7, at 541-42. As the author asserts,
The demands of a consumer oriented economy, governmental regulation, con-
stantly shifting and more complicated taxes and tax regulations, enforcement
of federal and state securities statutes aimed at fully informing the potential
investor, intricate corporate mergers and acquisitions, all have thrust duties
upon the accountant, expanded his engagement and complicated his work far
beyond what might have been regarded as mere bookkeeping duties 45 years
ago.
Id. See Causey, Duties and Liabilities of the CPA, in EVOLUTION OF AUDIT REsPoNsI-
BILITY 27 (1973) for an analysis of the development of the professional responsibility of
accounants. See also Mess, supra note 1, at 839-40.
160. Mess, supra note 1, at 839. See generally supra note 95.
161. Mess, supra note 1, at 839; Weiner, supra note 1, at 240, 250.
162. See Fiflis, supra note 3, at 106-07; Mess, supra note 1, at 839.
163. Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933); Securities Act of 1934, 48 Stat.
881 (1934). The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was enacted in 1934 to
maintain and enforce compliance with these regulations.
164. Marinelli, The Expanding Scope of Accountants' Liability to Third Par-
ties, 23 CASE W. REs. 113, 126-27 (1971).
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company's financial status."6 5 The principal user of the audit became third
parties (often unknown to the accountant) who the client was attempting to
influence. 6 The audit was the only means available for these third parties to
determine their potential risk in relation to the current financial posture of the
accountant's client. The accounting profession,' 67 as well as the legal system,
has acknowledged that accountants have assumed a role of responsibility and
public trust that extends beyond the relationship with the client. The Supreme
Court has described the role of the independent auditor as follows:
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation's finan-
cial status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility tran-
scending any employment relationship with the client. The independent public
accountant performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance to the
corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing public.
This "public watchdog" function demands that the accountant maintain total
independence from the client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the
public trust. To insulate from disclosure a certified public accountant's inter-
pretations of the client's financial statements would be to ignore the signifi-
cance of the accountant's role as a disinterested analyst charged with public
obligations."6 8
In return, the accountant is well-compensated for the complex, sophisti-
165. "Auditors now had a consumer for their reports beyond their direct client.
Further, the new consumer was likely not to be so well informed nor so sophisticated on
the financial matters being reported as was the direct client." Wyatt, Auditors' Re-
sponsibilities, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 331, 333 (1968). See Weiner, supra note 1, at 259
("accounting services as the major if not only way to efficiently compile and communi-
cate relevant financial information which serves as the basis for investment decisions");
Bilek, supra note 21, at 692 ("The accountant must also convey this information in an
understandable and nondeceptive manner. Accountants, therefore, must make their
language understandable to the frequent nonaccountant users of such information.").
166. See Solomon, supra note 50, at 74, where the author states, "[T]o say that
the primary utility derived from the independent accountant's report and statements
rests with third parties, such as suppliers, credit lenders, potential and present inves-
tors, and financial analysts is certainly no great overstatement." See also Note, Con-
temporary Approach, supra note 7, at 407 ("The accountant may have no contract
with these persons, but their decisions and conduct are influenced by his findings.");
Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 345, 461 A.2d at 149 ("It is now well recognized that the
audited statements are made for the use of third parties who have no contractual rela-
tionship with the auditor. Moreover, it is common knowledge that companies use audits
for many proper business purposes [involving third parties]."). See generally supra
note 7.
167. The first page of the AICPA's Code of Ethics is concerned with the ac-
countant's relationship to the public: "The ethical Code of the American Institute em-
phasizes the profession's responsibility to the public, a responsibility that has grown as
the number of investors has grown, as the relationship between corporate managers and
stockholders has become more impersonal and as government increasingly relies on ac-
counting information." American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Profes-
sional Standards, Code of Professional Ethics (CCH) ET § 51.04 (1978) [hereinafter
AICPA].
168. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984).
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cated services that he alone can provide.1 69 The accountant's legal responsibil-
ity should be commensurate with the benefits derived from his expanding
function in the business community. This responsibility should place him on an
equal footing with other types of professional liability. Like other profession-
als, the accountant should be liable for the foreseeable consequences of per-
forming a service in a negligent fashion. The law has slowly changed to reflect
his viewpoint. The focus of the current debate is on how far to expand the
accountant's liability.
The modern interpretation of Ultramares, (Credit Alliance Corp. v. Ar-
thur Andersen & Co.) limits recovery to those specifically known to the ac-
countant as parties who would rely on his audit.1 ' The lending institution's
ability to recover from an accountant is determined by whether the account-
ant's client, the borrowing party, disclosed the identity of the institution to the
accountant. For example, assume that the client informed the accountant that
it would use the audit to demonstrate the strength of its financial position in
seeking a loan from Bank A. If the audit were negligently performed, Bank A
could bring a negligence suit. But if Bank A denied the application and the
client then borrowed from Bank B, Bank B would be unable to sue since it was
not a specifically known third party. The Restatement position would allow
recovery in this situation. Bank B, although unidentified, is a member of "an
actually foreseen" limited class. However, if a potential purchaser of stock
relied on this same audit, he would be denied recovery since he would not be a
member of a class foreseen by the accountant. He is a potential investor, not a
potential creditor.17 '
Clearly, the Restatement standard reflects the accountant's responsibility
to those beyond the direct client, but does not protect the general public from
the accountant's negligence. While large, known investors are protected;
smaller, unknown investors who foreseeably and reasonably rely on the ac-
countant are forced to bear the risk of such reliance. 7 2 Therein lies the flaw of
the Restatement approach; the relying public, not the flourishing accounting
profession, needs protection.
Rosenblum and, most recently, Touche Ross, have shifted the loss away
from the innocent creditor or investor who relies on the audit to the easiest
cost-avoider, the auditor himself.17 3 In the example above, under the doctrine
169. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 68-73.
171. See Note, Accountants' Liability, supra note 7, at 584-85 n.108.
172. Besser, supra note 7, at 527 has concluded that "This is illogical, consider-
ing that the same standards of care must be observed regardless of the identity of the
actual recipient." Note, Accountant's Negligence, supra note 7, at 446-47. "[Tjhe Re-
statement approach ... draws an arbitrary limit on the class of potential plaintiffs ...
creat(ing) an undesirable inflexibility which denies injured third parties recovery sim-
ply because they do not fall within a specific class of persons." Id.
173. See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 312 (1970). A central theme
in tort literature is that tort liability should be imposed on the party who can most
easily avoid the occurrence of negligent conduct; see also Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 347,
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established by these cases, the potential investor could recover. He is a third
party whose reliance on the audited financial statements is reasonably foresee-
able to the accountant.
Extending accountant's liability to foreseeable users' audited financial
statements will not cripple the now financially strong accounting industry. The
expansion of the accountant's liability does not make him an insurer of the
accuracy of his work.""' He certifies only that the financial statements fairly
present the financial position of the firm in accordance with the GAAP as
codified by the AICPA. Liability is possible only in the circumstances in which
the accountant fails to conform to accepted professional practices by perform-
ing his duties in a careless, irresponsible fashion. Even when mistakes do slip
through the sophisticated modern audit procedures, the potential for unlimited
liability is diminished by the difficult burden of proof placed on the plaintiff in
a negligent misrepresentation suit. The plaintiff must show that he received
the accountant's audit from a company for a proper business purpose, that he
reasonably relied on the accountant's negligence, and that these particular
misstatements were the proximate cause of the plaintiff's specific financial
461 A.2d at 150 (accountants "can eliminate the necessity for costly separate investi-
gations by each party of interest"). Were CPA's to "engage in more thorough reviews"
they could "reduce the number of instances" of negligence. Id. at 350, 461 A.2d at
152. For a discussion of enterprise liability supporting the contention that the account-
ant is the "superior risk bearer," see Comment, Extensions of Accountants' Liability
for Negligence: One Step Closer to a New Implied Warranty of Results, 56 U. COLO.
L. REV. 265, 276-80 (1985); see also Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict
Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Dis-
tribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Klemme, The Enterprise
Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 153 (1976). See generally Weiner,
supra note 1, at 253.
174. It is not practical for the CPA to examine and test every transaction that a
company makes. Due to this inherent limitation in the auditing process, "the auditor is
not an insurer or a guarantor of the fairness of [financial statements] . . . " A. ARENS
& J. LOEBBECKE, supra note 19, at 18. See also Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 344, 461 A.2d
at 148, where the court notes that an auditor's review is subject to constraints because
he is not required to investigate every supporting document nor deemed to have the
training of a criminal investigator. Solomon, supra note 50, at 89, also concludes that
"It is clear that the CPA should not be made a guarantor of the absolute accuracy of
the financial statements he certifies." But see Comment, supra note 173, at 280-86
where the author argues for an implied warranty of accurate results, the theoretical
basis of which is product liability cases. For an argument that implied warranty doc-
trine can and should be applied to consumer service transactions, see Greenfield, Con-
sumer Protection in Service Transactions - Implied Warranties and Strict Liability
in Tort, 1974 UTAH. L. REV. 661; Norman, Consumer Service Transactions, Implied
Warranty and a Mandate for Realistic Reform, 11 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 405 (1980);
Singal, Extending Implied Warranties Beyond Goods Equal Protection for Consumers
of Services, 12 NEw ENG. 859 (1977); Comment, Guidelines for Extending Implied
Warranties to Service Markets, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 365 (1976); Note, The Application
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loss."75 Proving reliance and causation can be extremely difficult. Creditors
and investors, in making a decision, often rely on a variety of factors other
than the accountant's financial statements.1 6 Further, if the plaintiff could
have prevented his loss by the exercise of reasonable care and failed to do so,
his recovery will be limited or perhaps even barred under the doctrines of com-
parative or contributory negligence. 17 This would occur in a situation when,
for example, the plaintiff had done his own investigation of a company and
had reason to believe the financial statements prepared by the accountant did
not accurately reflect the company's financial position, but nonetheless contin-
ued to rely on the statements.
The accounting industry has several options through which to pay the cost
of negligence suits. It can raise the price of accounting services, thereby dis-
tributing the cost of negligent behavior to the general public. 7 8 It can utilize
malpractice insurance and charge the cost to the client. The client, in turn,
can allocate that cost to the public as a part of doing business. 179 Finally, the
175. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 350, 461 A.2d at 152; Note, Public Accountants
and Attorneys: Negligence and the Third Party, 47 NOTRE DAME L. 588, 605 (1971)
("If the courts adhere to strict rules of proof of causation, foreseeability, and reliance,
the profession will not face ruin."); see also Besser, supra note 7, at 537-41. See gener-
ally supra notes 44-59 and accompanying text.
176. Comment, Accountant's Liability, supra note 7, at 581-82; see Professional
Liability - A New Development, 99 N.J.L.R. 356, 356 (1976).
In the typical commercial transaction, the creditor or investor parting with his
money often relies on many factors other than a financial statement or legal
opinion proffered by the other side. Many investors do not bother with an
audit at all, but accept contractual representations and warranties. Others
bring in their own accountants and lawyers (with whom, of course, they are in
direct privity) to conduct the necessary investigations on which they rely.
Id.
177. Comparative negligence statutes, which now exist in over 40 jurisdictions,
reduce the plaintiff's recovery based on the proportion that his own fault contributed to
the injury. In states that still use the doctrine of contributory negligence, negligence on
the part of the plaintiff, will completely bar any recovery of damages. See K. CLARK-
SON, E. MILLER, & JENTZ, WEST'S BUSINESS LAW 69-70 (1986); see also Note, Ac-
countants' Liability, supra note 7, at 358-59. For a discussion of the role of contribu-
tory negligence in actions against accountants, see Menzel, supra note 54. See
generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 65, at 451-62; Note, Contemporary
Approach, supra note 7, at 413-14.
178. The Rosenblum court acknowledged that accountants are the most efficient
cost distributors. The court stated: "Isn't the risk of loss more easily distributed and
fairly spread by imposing it on the accounting profession, which can pass the cost of
insuring against the risk onto its customers, who can in turn pass the cost onto the
entire consuming public?" 93 N.J. at 351, 461 A.2d at 153 (quoting from Rusch Fac-
tors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D.R.I. 1968)); see also International Mortgage
v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d 806, 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218,
227 (1986) (the "enterprise liability" approach suggests that the burden would be fun-
neled down until it reached the consuming public); Marinelli, supra note 164, at 127-
28; Griffin, The Beleaguered Accountant: A Defendant's Viewpoint, 62 A.B.A.J. 759,
762 (1976).
179. The expansion of the liability of CPAs to foreseeable plaintiffs will increase
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auditor can limit the dissemination of his or her opinion through a separate
both the cost of insurance for auditors and the cost of an audit, as CPAs make a more
expansive examination in order to avoid negligence. Comment, CPA's Liability, supra,
note 21, discusses how the cost of insurance will be spread throughout society:
The degree to which CPAs can pass these increased costs on to their
clients depends on the elasticity of demand for and supply of CPAs' auditing
services. To the extent that such demand and supply are relatively inelastic,
much of the increased costs of insurance and additional auditing can be
passed on. To the extent that such demand and supply are relatively elastic,
however, CPAs will have to bear much of the increased costs of insurance and
additional auditing themselves.
Among large publicly held companies, the demand for CPA audit ser-
vices is inelastic because those companies are required by law to have annual
independent audits of their financial statements. The supply of CPA firms
with the expertise and resources to perform audits of that size and complexity
is also relatively inelastic. Therefore, most, if not all, of the initial increase in
CPA malpractice insurance premiums and the cost of augmented auditing
will be passed from the CPA to the client through higher audit fees.
Once the CPA passes on his increased insurance and auditing costs to the
client via higher fees, the extent to which a client company can in turn pass
the increased audit fee on to its customers or stockholders depends on the
elasticity of demand for and supply of its goods or services....
... Ultimately, the initial increase in CPA malpractice insurance premi-
ums and the cost of augmented auditing procedures, resulting from an ex-
panded law of accountants' liability, will be spread over a large group of peo-
ple .... Such a result is socially beneficial because it prevents the financial
demise of the accounting profession and the concomitant loss of the valuable
independent auditing function from the public markets.
Id. at 350-353. Another result is that diligent accounting firms that make sound audits
will benefit from low insurance premiums, since the difficulty in obtaining insurance
and the size of premiums increase with the frequency and size of an insured's loss.
Negligent accounting firms, in order to pay for the increased insurance will have to
absorb the cost, thus lowering their profit. Passing the cost to the client will not be
possible because the client will in turn hire the non-negligent accountant, whose fees
will be lower. The result is that the negligent accounting firm may be forced out of
business. Id. at 353-54. This is beneficial however, because "[tihere is no sound reason
to protect professional firms that act negligently, and accountants' liability can be an-
other means to make the accounting profession more reliable by weeding out the bad
firms." Note, Contemporary Approach, supra note 7, at 415. For a discussion of CPA
malpractice insurance, see Comment, Auditors' Third Party Liability: An Ill-Consid-
ered Extension of the Law, 46 WASH. L. REV. 675, 682-85 (1971) [hereinafter as Com-
ment, Auditors' Third Party Liability]. For a discussion of the concepts of supply,
demand, and market elasticity, see R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, MICROECONoMics 53-68
(5th ed. 1979); R. POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 196-97 (2d ed. 1977); P.
SAMUELSON, ECONoMics 380-81 (9th ed. 1973). The above analysis, however, is inap-
plicable to the smaller CPA firms. Since the number of firms capable of auditing
smaller companies is larger than the number of firms capable of auditing the large,
publicly-owned corporations, the supply of CPA's in this market is not inelastic.
In light of this relative elasticity of the demand for and the supply of audit
services among small privately held corporations, the result of the Rosenblum
decision for these small corporations and the CPA firms that audit them is
two-fold. First, for some small clients, CPA audits are a business necessity.
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Because of the inelasticity of this demand, CPAs will be able to pass on some
of their initial increases in insurance costs and auditing costs to these small
companies. They will not, however, be able to pass on these costs to the same
extent large firms will be able to pass on costs to their publicly held clients
because the supply of small CPA firms is not as inelastic as the supply of
large CPA firms. Second, clients that do not require audits but have them
performed for management purposes nonetheless may decide to cancel these
voluntary audits if CPAs increase their fees. In the alternative, these compa-
nies may substitute audits with "reviews" or "compilations" of their financial
statements. These two special CPA services require less work and therefore
cost less than a complete audit, but provide less assurance that the financial
statements are accurate. Therefore, it appears that, in practice, the Rosen-
blum rule will have more of an adverse financial impact on small and medium
sized CPA firms than on large firms.
Note, CPA's Liability, supra Note 21, at 351 n.19 (citations omitted). See Note, Ac-
countants Beware, supra note 148, at 1067, where the author discusses the effects of
expanded liability on smaller firms:
The smaller accounting firms are being hit the hardest, since litigation
will usually be limited to cases involving commercial transactions that do not
fall under the securities laws. Those cases generally involve smaller businesses
dealing with smaller accounting firms. Of the nearly one dozen insurance
companies which formerly offered liability insurance for smaller accounting
firms, only three companies still offer coverage.
Another commentator reports that:
Of those firms offering liability insurance to small companies, one has
stopped writing policies for individual accountants and anticipates ending its
group policy plan for the California Society of CPAs. For those companies
still offering liability insurance to smaller firms, premiums and deductibles
have skyrocketed while maximum coverage has plummeted. Larger firms have
also indicated that similar insurance problems are affecting them;
[jJudgements and settlements of lawsuits involving accountants have been
huge .... $180,000,000 for the 8 larger CPA firms since 1980, and insurance
for all firms has become limited and prohibitively expensive.
Collins, Minimizing Risk for CPAs is Focus of AICPA Conference, 161 J. ACCT., July
1986, at 52. These authors fear that due to the increased cost of insurance, many
smaller accounting firms may simply withdraw from the audit market altogether. See
also Comment, Auditors' Third Party Liability, supra note 179, where the author ar-
gues that expanded liability will result in injury to both the auditing profession and the
general public since only larger firms will remain solvent because only they could dis-
tribute the losses. In turn, an oligopoly consisting of the "Big Eight" accounting firms
could, through price-fixing powers, extract a large profit from society. See Gormeley,
supra note 10, at 570-73; Comment, Accountant's Liability to the Third Party and
Public Policy: A Calabresi Approach, 39 Sw. L.J. 689 (1985); Note, H. Rosenblum,
Inc. v. Adler: A Foreseeably Unreasonable Extension of an Auditor's Legal Duty, 48
ALB. L. REV. 876 (1984) for a conclusion that the imposition of accountants' liability to
all foreseeable persons for negligence is not justifiable economically. But see Weiner,
supra note 1, at 252 who argues that the economic consequences as such have been
given minimal consideration by the courts in other areas and that the accounting pro-
fession should not be singled out for protection. See generally Collins, supra note 3, at
57. For a brief discussion of reviews and compilations, see A. ARENS & J. LOEBBECKE,
AUDITING: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 742-50 (2d ed. 1980); Comment, Accountants'
Liability for Compilation and Review Engagements, 60 TEX. L. REv. 759 (1982).
[Vol. 53
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agreement with his client."'
The uniform expansion of accountant's liability for negligence to the fore-
seeable users of their financial statements will serve an important public bene-
fit: higher quality accounting services. Negligent auditing will be deterred as
accountants, realizing that their mistake will involve potentially greater finan-
cial consequences, will use even greater care to avoid them. Diligent account-
ing firms will reap the benefits of low insurance premiums while negligent
firms may eventually be forced out of business."' Expanding liability will also
lessen the likelihood that an accountant will use "creative methods" in order
to preserve a relationship with a major client. In this regard, the independent
role of the auditor will be preserved, in turn, ensuring a more accurate report
for the investing public. 8 2 On the whole, greater legal responsibility will in-
crease the public trust in and enhance the credibility of the public accountant.
180. See Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 351, 461 A.2d at 152 (quoting Stanton &
Dugdale, Recent Developments in Professional Negligence IL Accountants Liability to
Third Parties, 132 NEw L.J. 5 (1982)). Practically, however, the audited company
might be reluctant about such an idea because it would cast doubt on the financial
statements, while firms might be reluctant to attempt such an approach because they
would fear losing business to those who would not disclaim responsibility. Hence, this
policy is unlikely to work unless it is done on an uniform basis. See Comment, Rosen-
blum v. Adler, supra note 101, at 958 n.93. See also Rosenfield & Lorenson, Auditors'
Responsibilities and the Audit Report, J. ACCT., Sept. 1974, at 82-83. See Collins,
supra note 3, at 64 for suggestions for accountants on how to limit liability.
181. See generally supra note 180.
182. See Fishel, The Regulation of Accounting: Some Economic Issues, 52
BROOKLYN L. REv. 1051, 1052-55 (1987). See generally Fiflis, supra note 2, at 45-49;
Mess, supra note 1, at 857.
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